🇩🇪 Deutsche Version: Menschliche Person

The human person is a spiritual, self-subsistent being in the body (German), one who stands essentially in relation. This determination summarizes the central thesis of the dissertation: human personhood is “spiritual substance in the body in relation” (Bexten 2017, pp. 153 ff.).

Spiritual Substance

The human person is not a mere bundle of properties but a substance — an ens per se, a being that stands in itself. Thomas Aquinas calls the person “that which is most perfect in the whole of nature.” Josef Seifert stresses its spirituality: the person is not reducible to the material.

In the Body

Unlike purely spiritual beings (angels), the human person is essentially bodily. The body-soul unity (German) is not an accidental connection but belongs to the essence of the human being. Form and matter constitute a unity: the soul as spiritual form informs the body (German).

In Relation

The human person stands essentially in relation to other persons. The relational concept of person captures this dimension but must be complemented by the substance-ontological concept of person: the person has relations because she first is. The basal relations (bR1-bR5) clarify the relationship between human being and person.

Three Dimensions

The human person unfolds in three dimensions:

  1. First Dimension: Basic personhood — above all consciousness
  2. Second Dimension: person-behaviorreason, freedom, actus humanus
  3. Third Dimension: self-transcendence, love, affirmation

Dignity

Every human person has inalienable dignity, which is grounded in her being, not in her capacities. This holds from the embryo to the human being with dementia. Robert Spaemann: “There are no potential persons.”

Ontological classification: Superordinate concept: Person; subordinate concept: Currently Existing Person

Ontological relations:

Woman

The human person of female sex. The sexual character of the human being belongs to its bodily nature and is not merely a biological feature but informs the whole person. The woman is ordered toward the man; in the marital community (marriage (German)) the complementary ordering of the sexes toward one another is realized (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 228–238). The woman alone possesses the bodily capacity to receive and to carry new human life within herself.

As a human person, the woman possesses the full, inalienable dignity of the person. Her sexual character belongs to human nature, which is always determined as male or female. In spousal love (German) and bodily self-gift (German), the woman realizes the nuptial meaning of the body (German) in the total self-gift to the man.

As a mother — whether in gestational (German), genetic (German), or social (German) motherhood — she contributes in a unique way to the coming-to-be of new personal life and assumes responsibility within the family (German).

Ontological classification

Ontological relations:

Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood

Man

The human person of male sex. The sexual character of the human being belongs to its bodily nature and is not merely a biological feature but informs the whole person. The man is ordered toward the woman; in the marital community (marriage (German)) the complementary ordering of the sexes toward one another is realized (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 228–238).

As a human person, the man possesses the full, inalienable dignity of the person. His sexual character belongs to human nature, which is always determined as male or female. In spousal love (German) and bodily self-gift (German), the man realizes the nuptial meaning of the body (German) in the total self-gift to the woman. As a father (fatherhood (German)) he contributes essentially to the family (German) and assumes responsibility for the new life that proceeds from the marital community.

Ontological classification

Ontological relations:

Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood

Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.

Further sources:

  • Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae I, q. 29, a. 3 (“persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura”).
  • Spaemann, Robert (2006): Persons. The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’. Transl. Oliver O’Donovan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Seifert, Josef (1989): Das Leib-Seele-Problem und die gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. (German)

See also