The question of the forms of existence is the question of the different ways in which entities are. The Thomistic-personalist ontology distinguishes between the being of inanimate nature, biological life, and spiritual personhood; these forms of existence do not constitute a mere ladder of degrees, but differ essentially in their mode of being. Personhood represents the highest form of existence because it is spiritual substantial being in the body — a being that is given to itself and is able to unfold itself in cognition, freedom, and love. The form of existence of personhood is not derivable from lower modes of being, but is an archphenomenon of its own kind (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 137 ff.).
Ontological Derivedness
Ontological derivedness is a determination of being according to which an entity owes its being to another entity. It is ens ab alio — an entity from another. This determination expresses ontological contingency: the entity exists, but does not have to exist; it could also not have been. Ontological derivedness forms the disjoint counterpart to ontological originality (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 120—128).
All created entities without exception — stones, plants, animals, and persons — are ontologically derived. Only Absolute Being (God) is ontologically original. Thomas Aquinas grounds this in the real distinction between being and essence in all created entities. Where being and essence are not identical, being must be received from elsewhere.
Ontological derivedness implies ontological dependence, but is to be distinguished from it conceptually. Ontological derivedness concerns the origin of being (whence?). Ontological dependence concerns the preservation in being (by what does it persist?).
Ontological relations:
- is subclass of: form of existence
- (inverse) is disjoint with: ontological originality
Ontological Dependence
Ontological dependence is a determination of being according to which an entity, after coming into existence, requires continuous causal preservation by another entity in order to remain in being. It forms the counterpart to ontological independence and belongs to the fundamental existential determinations that Seifert systematizes in the line of realist ontology (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 120—128).
Ontological dependence is to be distinguished from ontological non-self-sufficiency. Ontological non-self-sufficiency states that an entity requires another as an ontological foundation (as the accident requires the substance). Ontological dependence, by contrast, means causal preservation in being.
A created entity can very well be ontologically self-sufficient (subsisting substantially in itself) and at the same time ontologically dependent. It requires the preserving causality of God, although it needs no ontological supporting foundation. The human person is in this sense ontologically dependent and at the same time ontologically self-sufficient.
Ontological relations:
- is subclass of: form of existence
- (inverse) is disjoint with: ontological independence
Ontological Autonomy
Ontological autonomy is a determination of being according to which an entity possesses its being in itself and not as the product or correlate of a consciousness constituting it. It forms the disjoint counterpart to ontological heteronomy. As an ontological category it is expressly directed against transcendental idealism, which traces the being of objects back to constitution by consciousness (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 120—128).
Within the framework of realist ontology, as held by Seifert and Thomas Aquinas, ontological autonomy belongs to all real entities. Stones, plants, animals, and persons exist independently of whether a consciousness perceives them or intentionally constitutes them.
Ontological autonomy is to be distinguished from ontological self-sufficiency. Ontological self-sufficiency means not being dependent on an ontological supporting foundation. Ontological autonomy denotes not being dependent on a constituting consciousness. Thus even an accident can be ontologically autonomous (it exists really, not merely in consciousness), although it is ontologically non-self-sufficient.
Ontological relations:
- is subclass of: form of existence
- is disjoint with: ontological heteronomy
Ontological Heteronomy
Ontological heteronomy is a determination of being according to which an entity owes its being to a consciousness constituting it. Ontologically heteronomous objects do not exist independently of the act of consciousness that brings them forth or sustains them — they are purely intentional objects. This category goes back essentially to Ingarden, who systematically unfolded it in his ontology of intentional objectivities (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 120—128).
Typical examples of ontologically heteronomous objects are fictional characters, literary worlds, and other products of creative activity of consciousness: Hamlet exists only insofar and as long as a consciousness constitutes him. Ontological heteronomy forms the disjoint counterpart to ontological autonomy, which belongs to all real entities. For the ontology of the person this distinction is of decisive importance: a real person is always ontologically autonomous — she does not owe her being to a consciousness thinking her. The conceptual content, by contrast, is as intentional content of an ontologically heteronomous nature.
Ontological relations:
- (inverse) is disjoint with: ontological autonomy
- is subclass of: form of existence
Ontological Self-Sufficiency
Ontological self-sufficiency is a determination of being according to which an entity requires no other entity as an ontological foundation for its existence. It subsists in itself (ens per se) and does not inhere in a bearer. Ontological self-sufficiency is the fundamental characteristic of substance, in contrast to the accident, which can subsist only in another (ontological non-self-sufficiency) (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 120—128).
For the ontology of the person, ontological self-sufficiency is of central importance. The person, as a substance, is ontologically self-sufficient. She is no mere attribute, no property, and no state of another entity, but an independently existing someone.
Ontological self-sufficiency is to be distinguished from ontological independence. An entity can be ontologically self-sufficient (needing no supporting foundation) and nevertheless ontologically dependent (in need of causal preservation). Likewise, ontological self-sufficiency is not to be equated with ontological autonomy, which constitutes a determination of being in its own right.
Ontological relations:
- is subclass of: form of existence
- is disjoint with: ontological non-self-sufficiency
Ontological Independence
Ontological independence is a determination of being according to which an entity, after coming into existence, requires no continuous causal preservation by another entity in order to remain in being. It forms the disjoint counterpart to ontological dependence (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 120—128).
Whether ontological independence actually applies to created entities is disputed within the Thomistic tradition. The classical position of Thomas Aquinas suggests that all created entities require the conservatio in esse by God and are therefore ontologically dependent. Ontological independence would then belong only to Absolute Being.
Seifert, by contrast, carefully distinguishes ontological independence from ontological originality. An entity could owe its origin to another (be ontologically derived) and nevertheless, once set into being, require no further preservation. Ontological independence is furthermore to be distinguished from ontological self-sufficiency, which means not being dependent on an ontological supporting foundation.
Ontological relations:
- is subclass of: form of existence
- is disjoint with: ontological dependence
Ontological Non-Self-Sufficiency
Ontological non-self-sufficiency is a determination of being according to which an entity requires another entity as an ontological foundation — it cannot subsist by itself, but inheres in a bearer. Ontological non-self-sufficiency forms the disjoint counterpart to ontological self-sufficiency and is the fundamental characteristic of the accident (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 120—128).
The classical example is color: it cannot exist without a colored body, but requires the substance as the bearer of its being. Likewise, relations, qualities, and quantities, as accidental determinations, are ontologically non-self-sufficient.
Ontological non-self-sufficiency is to be distinguished from ontological dependence. Ontological dependence concerns the causal preservation in being. Ontological non-self-sufficiency means inhering in a bearer. For the ontology of the person this distinction is central. The person, as a substance, is ontologically self-sufficient and precisely thereby ontologically distinct from the mere accident. She is someone and not merely a property of something.
Ontological relations:
- (inverse) is disjoint with: ontological self-sufficiency
- is subclass of: form of existence
Ontological Originality
Ontological originality is a determination of being according to which an entity has the ground of its being in itself. It is ens a se — an entity from itself, which owes its existence to no other. This determination belongs exclusively to Absolute Being (God) and forms the disjoint counterpart to ontological derivedness (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 120—128).
In the Thomistic tradition, ontological originality is synonymous with the aseitas of God. God alone exists necessarily and owes his being to no external cause. All created entities, by contrast, are ens ab alio — their being is derived and contingent.
Thomas Aquinas shows that in God being and essence coincide (esse and essentia are identical). In every created entity, by contrast, being is really distinct from essence. Ontological originality is thereby distinguished both from ontological self-sufficiency (which belongs to creatures as well) and from ontological independence, which concerns a different respect of the mode of existence.
Ontological relations:
- is subclass of: form of existence
- is disjoint with: ontological derivedness
Ontological classification: Superordinate concept: being; subordinate concepts: ontological derivedness, ontological dependence, ontological autonomy, ontological heteronomy, ontological self-sufficiency, ontological independence, ontological non-self-sufficiency, ontological originality
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 4 (identity of being and essence in God, real distinction in the creature). Transl. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Bros., 1947.
- Seifert, Josef (1987): Back to ‘Things in Themselves’. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism. London/New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Systematics of the forms of existence and determinations of being)
See also: