Ontological dignity is the inalienable, objective value of the human person. It is an archphenomenon: not derivable from anything else, but immediately evident in the encounter with the person.
Ontological Classification
- is a necessary essential characteristic of every person
- is grounded in: personhood itself (the person is the perfectissimum in tota natura)
- grounds: Personalist Norm
- is the ground of: Uniqueness of the Person
Content
Ontological dignity is neither an ascribed property nor a legal title, but a reality inherent in the being of the person. It is:
- inalienable — cannot be annulled by illness, dementia, disability, or by one’s own conduct;
- objective — not dependent on recognition by others;
- proto-phenomenal — not derivable from biological, psychological, or social features.
Since the person is the perfectissimum in tota natura (Thomas Aquinas), she is owed affirmation and love for her own sake — this is the core of the Personalist Norm.
Distinction
Ontological dignity differs from human dignity in the constitutional-legal sense (Article 1 of the German Basic Law), which is a legal principle. Ontological dignity is the deeper ground on which the legal principle rests, without ever exhaustively grasping it.
It likewise differs from intrinsic value, which belongs to the higher animal by virtue of its capacity for sentience: the intrinsic value of the higher animal is real and grounds a duty toward animal welfare, yet it remains categorially lower than ontological dignity, which is proper to the person alone.
Ontological classification: Superordinate concept: Dignity; is a subclass of: Archphenomenon, Essential Characteristic
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae I, q. 29, a. 3 (the person as “the most perfect in all of nature”).
- Alexander of Hales: Summa Theologica, Lib. III, Inq. 1 (ca. 1245) (the person as “res naturae cum distinctione proprietatis ad dignitatem pertinente”).
- Spaemann, Robert: Persons: The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’, transl. Oliver O’Donovan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.