The concept of being is the most fundamental and at the same time the most difficult to determine concept of metaphysics. What do we mean when we say that something is? In the Thomistic tradition, being (esse) is no empty universal concept but the innermost act of everything real — the actus essendi.
For the question of personhood it is decisive that only a concept of being that understands being as actuality and fullness does justice to personhood. A purely formal or logical concept of being falls short. Personhood falls under the substantial concept of being: the person is an ens per se, a self-subsistent being whose being does not depend on another bearer (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 115 ff.).
Ontological classification: Subordinate concepts: form of existence, mode of being
Ontological relations:
- is presupposed by: entity
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae I, q. 3, a. 4 (esse as actus essendi).
- Aristotle: Metaphysics IV (being as the basic concept of philosophy).
- Aristotle: Metaphysics VII (substance as ens per se).