Was den Menschen zum Menschen macht

Max Scheler

4 Min. Lesezeit

🇩🇪 Deutsche Version: Max Scheler

Max Scheler is the thinker who raised the question of the human being to the rank of the fundamental question of philosophy. His concept of person and his philosophical anthropology are an important point of reference for the book, especially his insight into the absolute character of the concept of person and into the ambiguity of the word “human being.”

Key Contribution

Scheler formulates the programmatic sentence: “All the central problems of philosophy can be traced back to the question of what the human being is.” At the same time he recognizes the ambiguity of the word “human being” (Mensch): it can mean the biological organism or the personal being. Whoever fails to attend to this ambiguity inevitably falls into confusion — for depending on which meaning is presupposed, entirely different answers result to the question of dignity, rights, and worthiness of protection (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 61 ff.).

Central Ideas in the Book

Person as an Absolute Name

For Scheler, “person” is an absolute name — a word that cannot be traced back to anything else. Person is not a generic concept, not a role, not a function-bearer, but the designation of a unique, unrepeatable being. This insight accords with the tradition of Boethius and Thomas Aquinas, who determined the person as that which is unique (individua) and most perfect.

The Ambiguity of the Word “Human Being”

Scheler uncovers the fact that the word “human being” is used in different senses without this being noticed. Some mean by “human being” only the biological organism (homo sapiens); others mean the human person as a spiritual being. The forgetfulness of the person also feeds on this ambiguity: whoever understands “human being” only biologically can easily come to regard personhood as something additional that one may have or not have.

Value Philosophy and Personal Dignity

Scheler founds a material ethics of value in which the person appears as the bearer of values. The dignity of the person is not a merely formal principle but a substantively filled value that can be grasped in insight. This line is carried forward by Josef Seifert, who understands personal dignity as an ontological value.

Place in the Book

Scheler is drawn upon above all in the chapters Introduction (German) and What Is a Person? (German). His diagnosis of the ambiguity of the concept of the human being and his understanding of the person as an absolute name prepare the systematic unfolding of the substance-ontological concept of person.

Sources: Bexten 2017, pp. 61 ff. (Scheler’s diagnosis of the ambiguity of the concept of the human being and person as an absolute name).

Further sources:

  • Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (1913/1916). Halle: Niemeyer. Engl.: Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. Transl. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 (person as an absolute name, material ethics of value against Kant’s formalism)
  • Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (1928). Darmstadt: Reichl. Engl.: The Human Place in the Cosmos. Transl. Manfred S. Frings. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009 (philosophical anthropology, ambiguity of the concept of the human being)

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