The action (actus humanus) is the conscious, free enactment of the person — in contrast to mere occurrences (actus hominis), which take place in the human being without his positing them as a person. In the action, person-behavior comes to light. The person actualizes herself by knowing, deciding, and taking responsibility.
The oblivion of the person can manifest itself precisely in actions. It shows itself when the action disregards the personhood of the other or one’s own personhood — when the human being is treated as if he were not a someone but a mere something. The moral quality of an action is ultimately measured by whether it does justice to personhood — one’s own as well as that of the other (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 160—185).
Personal Act
A single act of the Deutera Energeia: an act of thought
Ontological relations:
- has subclass: Empathy
- has subclass: Decision
- has subclass: Cognition
- has subclass: Prayer
- has subclass: Action
- has subclass: Informed Consent
- has subclass: Intention
- has subclass: Intentional Feeling
- has subclass: Passion
- is subclass of: Event
- has subclass: Self-Gift
- has subclass: Social Act
- has subclass: Speech Act
- has subclass: Judgment
- has subclass: Whistleblowing
- has subclass: Listening
- (inverse) range: expresses
The Body as Expression of Personal Acts
Ontological relation: The body expresses personal acts — in its “language” it can be true (adequate) or false (inadequate). The body is not mute matter but the field of expression of spiritual interiority. When the bodily gesture contradicts the inner enactment — as in the lie —, the language of the body becomes inadequate (Wojtyła).
- Domain: Body
- Range: Personal Act
Morally Good Action
A morally good action is an action that is, in its object, intention, and circumstances, compatible with the moral ought and the Personalist Norm. It presupposes the free will of the person: only one who acts freely acts morally. Moreover, it requires the conscience as an inner instance that recognizes what is morally commanded and calls the person to the good (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 170—185).
Thomas Aquinas teaches that an action is fully good only when all three determining elements — object (obiectum), intention (finis operantis), and circumstances (circumstantiae) — are good. Hildebrand adds: the morally good action is at the same time an appropriate value-response to objective values. Whoever does the good because it is good actualizes the highest form of moral motivation.
The morally good action belongs to the third dimension of personhood: it perfects the person qualitatively and contributes to the actualization of virtue. It is mutually exclusive with the morally bad action (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 175—183).
Ontological relations:
- is subclass of: Action
- (inverse) is mutually exclusive with: Morally Bad Action
Morally Bad Action
A morally bad action is an action that, in its object, intention, or circumstances, violates the moral ought and the Personalist Norm. Whereas in the morally good action all three determining elements must be good, for moral badness it suffices that one of them be bad: bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 170—185).
Thomas Aquinas distinguishes degrees of moral badness. The gravest form is the intrinsically evil act (actus intrinsece malus). According to its object — independently of intention and circumstances — it is always and everywhere morally bad, because it violates the dignity of the person in its very essence.
Hildebrand emphasizes that the morally bad action presupposes a value-blindness toward objective values or constitutes a free decision against the recognized good.
The morally bad action degrades the person qualitatively (third dimension) and, as a crime, can at the same time violate the legal order (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 175—183).
Ontological relations:
- has subclass: Intrinsically Evil Act
- is subclass of: Action
- is mutually exclusive with: Morally Good Action
- has subclass: Crime
Omission
The omission is the knowing and willing non-acting in a situation in which the person could and ought to have acted. Ontologically it is not a mere absence of action but itself an act of the will — a deciding-against the deed (cf. Bexten 2017, p. 206 ff.).
For an omission to be morally imputable, two conditions must be met: first, the person must possess sufficient knowledge that an action is commanded. Second, she must possess the freedom to carry out the action. Where conscience and responsibility disclose a duty to act — for instance in giving aid to a person in need —, the omission can be a morally bad action and a source of guilt. Thomas Aquinas emphasizes that the omission is imputable precisely because the will freely disposes over its acting.
Ontological relations:
- is subclass of: Action
Ontological classification: Superordinate concept: Personal Act; subordinate concepts: Morally Good Action, Morally Bad Action, Atonement, Omission, Reparation
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae I-II, qq. 18—21 (on the moral evaluation of human actions)
- Dietrich von Hildebrand: Ethik (1973). In: Gesammelte Werke, vol. II. Regensburg: Habbel (German) (value-response and moral motivation)
- Wojtyła, Karol (1969): Osoba i czyn. Kraków (German edition: Person und Tat, Freiburg: Herder, 1981) (German) (the body as expression of personal acts)
See also: