The distinction between act (actus, actuality) and potency (possibility) goes back to Aristotle and is of enduring significance for the question of personhood. Possibility is not nothing — it is something entirely real. The acorn really has within it the disposition to become an oak, and not, say, the disposition to become an elephant. What an entity can become according to possibility shows what it already is according to its essence.
From the book
“An acorn is not yet an oak. But neither is it nothing. It carries within itself the possibility of becoming an oak. This possibility is real — it belongs to the essence of the seed.”
— Actuality and Possibility (German), Chapter 4
The book distinguishes three kinds of possibility (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 155—170): first, passive possibility: a piece of wood can be worked into a chair, but does not strive toward this of itself; its realization comes from without. Second, the active disposition (active potency): the acorn strives from within toward becoming an oak; the direction lies in the acorn itself. Third, the learnable capacity: a human being can learn to play the piano because he possesses the active disposition for it, which he then develops.
This distinction is decisive for the question of the embryo. The embryo does not merely have the passive possibility of one day thinking (as wood can become a chair). It has the active disposition for it. It strives from within toward the unfolding of its capacities for thought, will, and love.
The difference between active and passive possibility suffices on its own to make clear why the human zygote is a human person and not a “potential person.” The embryo unfolds what it already is. It is not first made into a human being — it is a human being and unfolds its being human from the substance outward. Günther Pöltner has systematically worked out this understanding of the argument from potentiality: active potency is not the possibility of later becoming a person, but the rational nature already present in its first actuality.
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: What Is Human Personhood? (German) (esp. 4.4)
Act
The realization, the being-actual of an entity. The act (actus, Greek energeia) is the correlative concept to potency: whereas potency designates the faculty or possibility, the act is the actual realization. Together they form the fundamental pair of principles, act and potency, that runs through the whole of actuality.
For the understanding of the person, the distinction between first actuality (prote energeia — the substantial being of the person) and second actuality (deutera energeia — the exercise of personal faculties) is decisive: personhood is act of the first order and ontologically precedes every activity (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 166–172).
Ontological classification:
- Superordinate concept: act and potency
- Subordinate concepts: first actuality (prote energeia), second actuality (deutera energeia), life
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
See also: personhood, person, embryo, substance, form and matter, soul, first dimension, second dimension, third dimension, person-behavior, cognition, freedom, love, dignity, someone, biological life, body-soul unity, human person, nature, agere sequitur esse, concept of person, fertilization, dementia, metaphysics, essential law, archphenomenon, self-consciousness, reason, personalist norm, body, insight, truth, oblivion of the person, basal relations, personal life, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Robert Spaemann, Josef Seifert, Chapter 4: Personhood (German), potentia objectiva, potentia subjectiva, form and matter
See also: potency, act and potency, prote energeia, deutera energeia, personhood, person-behavior, substance, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas
Active Potency
The development-tendency intrinsic and proper to the essence of an entity, to become or actualize something not yet realized (e.g., the potency of the embryo to develop rational behavior). Active potency must be strictly distinguished from passive potency: whereas passive potency designates merely the faculty to be changed from without, active potency brings forth realization out of itself.
For personal ontology, active potency is of central importance: the embryo possesses the active potency for person-behavior — not because something would have to be added to it from without, but because the rational life-principle (soul) is intrinsically operative from conception onward (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 170–178).
Ontological classification:
- Superordinate concept: potency
- Subordinate concepts: competency
Ontological relations:
- distinct from: passive potency
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
See also: passive potency, potency, act and potency, personhood, person-behavior, embryo, first dimension, competency
Deutera Energeia
Second actuality; the exercise of activities and faculties laid down in the first actuality (substance) (e.g., actual thinking, willing, loving). Deutera energeia is the Aristotelian term for the second stage of realization: the activity that proceeds from substantial being.
For personal ontology, the distinction between prote energeia and deutera energeia is central. Personhood is prote energeia — it ontologically precedes every person-behavior and can be constituted by no person-behavior. Thinking, willing, feeling, acting are deutera energeia. They presuppose personhood but do not ground it. Whoever reduces the person to its deutera energeia (as does the empirical-functionalist concept of person) confuses the ground of cognition with the ground of being (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 166–172).
Ontological classification:
- Superordinate concept: act
Ontological relations:
- presupposes: prote energeia
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
See also: prote energeia, act, personhood, person-behavior, second dimension, third dimension, consciousness, agere sequitur esse, Aristotle, Robert Spaemann
Passive Potency
The faculty of an entity to be changed by extrinsic influence. In contrast to active potency, which designates the intrinsic development-tendency of an entity, passive potency means the mere receptivity to action from without.
The distinction between active and passive potency is decisive for personal ontology: the human person possesses an active potency for person-behavior — it develops rationality, freedom, and love out of itself, when development is not impeded. The person is not made into a person from without, but unfolds what it essentially is from conception onward (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 170–178).
Ontological classification:
- Superordinate concept: potency
Ontological relations:
- distinct from: active potency
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
See also: active potency, potency, act and potency, personhood
Potentia objectiva
The potentia objectiva is mere thinkability: the logical non-contradictoriness of a state of affairs. It designates no real faculty of an existing entity, but pure non-contradictoriness. Something is “objectively possible” if it can be thought without falling into a logical contradiction.
The distinction between potentia objectiva and potentia subjectiva is of decisive importance for the personhood ontology. A being that does not yet possess personhood has no potentia subjectiva to become a person. There are no “potential persons” (cf. Bexten 2017, ch. 4.5). The potentia objectiva, as a subclass of potency, is distinct from the potentia subjectiva.
Ontological classification: Superordinate concept: potency, act and potency; distinct from: potentia subjectiva
Potentia subjectiva
The potentia subjectiva is the real faculty of an existing entity (subiectum) to develop into something. Unlike the mere thinkability of the potentia objectiva, this is an actual faculty anchored in a real bearer.
The central thesis of the dissertation runs: there is no potentia subjectiva to become a person. There are no potential persons (cf. Bexten 2017, ch. 4.5). Whoever exists as a human being is a person from the very beginning, not a potential person. The embryo has the potentia subjectiva to actualize its person-behavior (i.e., to think, to will, to love). But it does not have the potentia subjectiva to become a person — for it already is a person. This distinction is fundamental for understanding the first dimension of personhood.
Ontological classification: Superordinate concept: potency, act and potency; distinct from: potentia objectiva
Potency
The possibility, capacity, or faculty of an entity to become or to do something. Potency is the correlative concept to act: whereas the act designates realization, potency means the as-yet-unrealized possibility. Together they form the fundamental pair of principles, act and potency.
Potency divides into: active potency (intrinsic development-tendency), passive potency (receptivity to action from without), potentia subjectiva (the real faculty of an existing entity), and potentia objectiva (mere thinkability). For personal ontology the decisive point is: there is no potentia subjectiva to become a person — there are no potential persons. The person is from conception onward (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 166–178).
Ontological classification:
- Superordinate concept: act and potency
- Subordinate concepts: active potency, passive potency, potentia subjectiva, potentia objectiva
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
See also: act, act and potency, active potency, passive potency, personhood, embryo, first dimension, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas
Prote Energeia
First actuality; the substance as such, which harbors within itself the possibility of a multitude of further actualizations. The person is prote energeia (Spaemann/Aristotle): it is not the result of a change, but of a coming-into-being.
The prote energeia is the key concept for understanding personhood. Personhood is first actuality. It ontologically precedes every person-behavior and can be constituted by no person-behavior. The deutera energeia (second actuality: thinking, willing, loving) presupposes the prote energeia.
A human being who is currently exercising no person-behavior — embryo, sleeper, dementia patient — does not cease to be a person. His personhood is prote energeia (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 166–172).
Ontological classification:
- Superordinate concept: act
Ontological relations:
- is presupposed by: deutera energeia
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
See also: deutera energeia, act, personhood, person, substance, person-behavior, basic form of actuality, first dimension, agere sequitur esse, Aristotle, Robert Spaemann
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Aristotle: Metaphysics IX (Theta), 1045b–1052a (on the basic distinction between act and potency).
- Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae I, q. 77, a. 1 (on the relation between substance and faculty).
- Spaemann, Robert: Persons. The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’, transl. Oliver O’Donovan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 (on the distinction between prote and deutera energeia in the person).
- Seifert, Josef (1987): Back to ‘Things in Themselves’. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism. London/New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul (on the ontological grounding of the act-potency distinction).
- Conrad-Martius, Hedwig (1957): Das Sein. Munich: Kösel (on the reality of potency) (German).