Substance (Lat. substantia, literally: that which stands beneath) denotes in philosophy a self-subsisting being — something that stands in itself and is not merely “something in something else.” The Person is a Substance in this sense: it is the bearer of all its properties, yet is exhausted by none of them. By contrast, supervening properties (accidents) such as hair color, body height, or abilities are something that adheres to a self-subsisting being but cannot stand on its own.
From the book
“Everything that is — everything that really exists or in some form has subsistence — we call an entity. That is the widest concept there is.”
— First Questions about Being, Chapter 4 (German)
Boethius recognized in the 6th century that the person must be sought not in the realm of the accidents but in the realm of substance. He writes: “Because the person cannot exist outside of nature and because the person cannot be located in the supervening properties, it therefore remains that one must predicate the person as existing in self-subsisting beings.”
His famous definition runs: the person is an individual self-subsisting being with a rational nature (rationalis naturae individua substantia). Thus Personhood is not one property alongside others but the underlying ground of all faculties and properties (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 115—130) (German).
The substantial being of the human person is dynamic, not rigid: it is a “being-able-to-be-itself” (Conrad-Martius). The spiritual substance is the most dynamic thing there is — precisely because the person is a self-subsisting being, it can communicate itself, know, and love. Being a substance does not mean closedness but openness: only one who is present to itself can go out of itself. Substantiality is never purely empirically perceptible but requires spiritual insight.
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: What is Human Personhood? (esp. 4.5), Chapter 3 (German)
Animate Substance
Substance that possesses a principle of life (Soul / ψυχή) (German). Animate substance differs from Purely Material Substance in that it has an inner principle of life — a soul that informs and animates matter.
The Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition distinguishes three levels of animate substance: Vegetative Substance (vegetative life-principle: nutrition, growth, reproduction), Animal Substance (sensitive life-principle: sensation and motion), and Spiritual Substance (rational life-principle: cognition, freedom, love). This gradation is not merely a matter of degree but of essence (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 132—140) (German).
Ontological classification:
- Broader concept: Substance
- Narrower concepts: Vegetative Substance, Animal Substance, Spiritual Substance
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
See also: Person, Personhood, Human Person, Form and Matter, Soul, Body-Soul Unity, Body, Act and Potency, Dignity, Someone, Person-Behavior, First Dimension, Cognition, Freedom, Embryo, Love, Nature, Agere sequitur esse, Concept of Person, Substance-Ontological Concept of Person, Basal Relations, Metaphysics, Law of Essence, Archphenomenon, Personalistic Norm, Interiority, Self-Consciousness, Reason, Intentionality, Self-Transcendence, Dementia, Fertilization, Biological Life, Truth, Insight, Second Dimension, Boethius, Thomas Aquinas, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Robert Spaemann, Aristotle, Josef Seifert, René Descartes, Chapter 4: Personhood (German), Chapter 3: Concept of Person (German)
See also: Substance, Spiritual Substance, Animal Substance, Vegetative Substance, Purely Material Substance, Soul, Life, Form, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas
Spiritual Substance
Substance that possesses a rational life-principle and is thereby essentially different from all non-spiritual substances. Spiritual substance is the highest level of substantial being: it comprises everything that distinguishes animate substance (the principle of life) but surpasses it through rationality — the capacity for Cognition, free will, and love.
The Person is spiritual substance. This thesis does not claim that the person is a pure spirit (as with Descartes) but that its substantial being is a spiritual one — also and precisely as a bodily being. The human person is spiritual substance in the body. Spiritual substance is mutually exclusive with Animal Substance: the difference between person and animal is not one of degree but one of essence (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 132—150) (German).
Ontological classification:
- Broader concept: Animate Substance
- Narrower concepts: Person
Ontological relations:
- mutually exclusive with: Animal Substance
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
See also: Animate Substance, Person, Substance, Animal Substance, Soul, Body-Soul Unity, Spiritual Being, Cognition, Free Will, Love, Thomas Aquinas, Boethius
Vegetative Substance
Animate substance with a vegetative life-principle (nutrition, growth, reproduction). Vegetative substance is the lowest level of animate substance: it possesses a life-principle (Soul) but only in the vegetative form — without sensation (as in the animal) and without spirit (as in the person).
Vegetative substance exceeds Purely Material Substance in dignity but is itself exceeded by Animal Substance. The fundamental form of actuality of the human person is not reducible to vegetative substance (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 132—140) (German).
Ontological classification:
- Broader concept: Animate Substance
Ontological relations:
- exceeds in dignity: Purely Material Substance
- is exceeded in dignity by: Animal Substance
- fundamental form of actuality is not reducible to: Vegetative Substance
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
See also: Animate Substance, Animal Substance, Purely Material Substance, Spiritual Substance, Substance, Fundamental Form of Actuality, Soul
Purely Material Substance
Substance without a life-principle; inorganic entity (e.g., stones, minerals). Purely material substance is the lowest level of substantial being: it stands below the animate substances (plants, animals, spiritual substances) and is essentially different from them.
The fundamental form of actuality of the human person is not reducible to purely material substance: personhood cannot be derived from physical or chemical processes. Vegetative Substance exceeds purely material substance in dignity (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 132—140) (German).
Ontological classification:
- Broader concept: Substance
Ontological relations:
- is exceeded in dignity by: Vegetative Substance
- fundamental form of actuality is not reducible to: Purely Material Substance
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
See also: Substance, Animate Substance, Vegetative Substance, Animal Substance, Spiritual Substance, Fundamental Form of Actuality
Substantiality
Substantiality means the self-subsistence of the person. The human person is an ens per se, an entity that stands in itself and is not merely a property in something else. This substantiality is not to be understood as rigidity or closedness. It is a dynamic standing-in-itself that constitutes the precondition for all self-communication, cognition, and love. Hedwig Conrad-Martius speaks of the “being-able-to-be-itself” of spiritual substance — precisely because the person is present to itself, it can go out of itself.
The substantiality of personhood is never purely empirically perceptible but requires spiritual insight. It is grounded in the first dimension of personhood and persists as long as the person exists (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 115—145) (German).
Animal Substance
Animate substance with a sensitive life-principle (sensation, motion) but without spiritual being. Animal substance stands in the gradation of entities above Vegetative Substance (which has only vegetative life) and below Spiritual Substance (which possesses rational life).
Animal substance is mutually exclusive with spiritual substance: the difference between animal and Person is not one of degree but one of essence. The animal senses but does not know in the proper sense; it reacts but does not act freely; it has drives but no love. The fundamental form of actuality of the human person is not reducible to animal substance. The person exceeds animal substance in dignity (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 132—140) (German). Within animal substance the ontology distinguishes between higher animals (with a centralized nervous system and documented capacity for sensation) and lower animals — a purely intra-animal differentiation that leaves the essential difference from the person untouched.
Ontological classification:
- Broader concept: Animate Substance
Ontological relations:
- mutually exclusive with: Spiritual Substance
- exceeds in dignity: Vegetative Substance
- is exceeded in dignity by: Person
- fundamental form of actuality is not reducible to: Animal Substance
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
See also: Animate Substance, Vegetative Substance, Spiritual Substance, Purely Material Substance, Substance, Fundamental Form of Actuality, Person
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Boethius (ca. 512—522): Contra Eutychen et Nestorium (Liber de persona et duabus naturis), ch. 3.
- Conrad-Martius, Hedwig (1957): Das Sein. Munich: Kösel. (German)
See also
Person, Personhood, Nature, Dignity, Someone, Substance-Ontological Concept of Person, Personalistic Norm, Truth, Soul, Form and Matter, Act and Potency, Boethius, Thomas Aquinas, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Aristotle, Josef Seifert