The higher animal designates, within the class of animals, those living beings that possess a centralized nervous system and are therefore capable of sentience in the full sense: of pain, suffering, fear, well-being, pleasure. Paradigmatic are all vertebrates — mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fish — as well as, among the invertebrates, the cephalopods (octopus, squid, cuttlefish) and the decapod crustaceans (crabs, lobsters, shrimp).
The distinction between higher and lower animals is an intra-animal distinction. It concerns gradations within the animal substance and leaves untouched the categorial essential difference between any animal and the person. The higher animal is not “almost a person,” and it does not become a person through its capacity for sentience — it remains a substance with a sensitive, but not a spiritual, vital principle (cf. spiritual soul).
Delimitation from the Lower Animal
The lower animal does not possess a centralized nervous system sufficient for conscious processing of pain. Its behavior is largely reflexive; a conscious subjective experience of pain cannot be demonstrated. Paradigmatic are simple worms and many simple invertebrates.
What is decisive is not mere nociception (German) — the neural processing of noxious stimuli — but its transformation into subjective experience. Nociception can occur without conscious suffering; in higher animals, however, it is a necessary condition of a real capacity for suffering.
International Convergence of the Evidence
Four independent international reference documents arrive at a convergent finding that empirically underpins the philosophical talk of the “higher animal”:
- Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (2012): Adopted on 7 July 2012 at the Francis Crick Memorial Conference at Churchill College (Cambridge). Neuroscientists state that non-human animals — including all mammals, birds, and other animals such as the octopuses — possess the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states.
- New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness (2024): Published on 19 April 2024 at New York University in the context of the conference The Emerging Science of Animal Consciousness (18–19 April 2024). Initiated by Jeff Sebo (CMEP) and signed within an initial group of 39 scientists and philosophers (among them Kristin Andrews, Jonathan Birch, Jeff Sebo); by now over 480 public signatories. Strong scientific evidence for consciousness in mammals and birds; a realistic possibility in all vertebrates as well as in cephalopods, decapods, and insects. Even the realistic possibility of conscious experience suffices as a ground for ethical consideration.
- EU Directive 2010/63/EU: Protects all living non-human vertebrates (including independently feeding larval forms and mammalian fetuses in the last third of their development) as well as living cephalopods as sentient beings (Art. 1(3)). Entered into force on 9 November 2010; the national transposition provisions apply from 1 January 2013. Oriented to the Three-R principle: Replace, Reduce, Refine.
- UK Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act (2022): In its base form recognizes all vertebrates other than the human being as sentient beings (s. 5(1)). Cephalopods and decapod crustaceans were brought within its scope through the supplementary regulation The Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022 (Amendment) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/1268, in force since 29 November 2022). The Act establishes an Animal Sentience Committee to assess policy decisions.
The four documents support the class of the higher animal both scientifically and legally. The cephalopod is the only invertebrate taxon recognized consistently as sentient across all four documents.
Nociception
Nociception is the neural processing of noxious stimuli. It is not identical with conscious experience of pain, but in the higher animal it is a necessary condition of the latter. The central nervous system transforms nociceptive signals into subjective, affectively evaluated states: pain, fear, suffering. In very simple invertebrates, nociception may be present without passing over into contents of consciousness.
Intrinsic Value and Animal Welfare
From the capacity for sentience of the higher animal there follows an intrinsic value: an inherent worth that the animal possesses independently of its usefulness to the person. From this inherent worth there arises a real duty of animal welfare (German), in particular a strict duty to avoid avoidable suffering. This duty is real, but it is qualitatively weaker than the duty toward persons — for the categorial leap from the sensitive to the spiritual substance is bridged by no degree of developed sentience, however high.
The dignity hierarchy of the Personhood ontology orders this as follows:
Person > higher animal > lower animal > plant > purely material substance.
Ontological dignity belongs exclusively to the person. To the higher animal there belongs an intrinsic value — structurally akin, but categorially lower.
Animal Welfare of Higher Animals
The animal welfare of higher animals is an intensified form of animal welfare: since the capacity for sentience is scientifically established and internationally recognized in law, the duty to avoid avoidable suffering is here especially strict. It is graduated according to the degree of demonstrated capacity for suffering and remains always subordinate to personal dignity.
Ontological Classification
- Genus: Animal substance (substance with a sensitive vital principle)
- Distinct from: lower animal (intra-animal); person (categorially essentially different)
- Intrinsic value: yes (from the capacity for sentience)
- Ontological dignity: no (proper to the person alone)
- Chapter reference: Appendix VII of the Personhood ontology (extension 2026-04-20)
Ontological Relations
- has capacity for sentience: sentience (subjective affective experience)
- has central nervous system: biological substrate of conscious pain processing
- surpasses in dignity: lower animal, plant, purely material substance
- is essentially different from: person, human person
Sources
- Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (2012-07-07). Francis Crick Memorial Conference, Churchill College, University of Cambridge. Authored by Philip Low, edited by Jaak Panksepp, Diana Reiss, David Edelman, Bruno Van Swinderen, Philip Low, Christof Koch; signed in the presence of Stephen Hawking.
- New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness (2024-04-19). NYU Center for Mind, Ethics, and Policy (CMEP); initiated by Jeff Sebo. 39 initial signatories.
- Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes. OJ L 276, 20.10.2010, p. 33. Entry into force: 9 November 2010; application from 1 January 2013.
- Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022. UK Public General Acts 2022 c. 22 (Royal Assent 28 April 2022).
- The Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022 (Amendment) Regulations 2022, SI 2022/1268 (in force since 29 November 2022) — inclusion of cephalopods and decapod crustaceans within the scope of protection.
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Aristotle: De anima, II. On the tripartition of the soul into vegetative, sensitive, and rational vital principle.
- Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae I, q. 78 (De potentiis animae). On the gradation of the powers of the soul.
- Spaemann, Robert: Persons: The Difference between “Someone” and “Something”, transl. Oliver O’Donovan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. On the categorial difference between person and animal.