An accident (Lat. accidens, that which befalls) is a property that adheres to a self-subsistent being yet cannot exist on its own — for instance hair color, bodily height, or a particular capacity.
Already Boëthius saw that personhood must be located not in the domain of accidents but in the domain of substance. Were the person merely a supervening property, it could be lost like any other accident. Person-behavior — that is, what the person does and expresses — belongs to the accidental domain and must not be confused with personhood itself. Whoever makes personhood depend on accidental capacities such as consciousness or rationality commits a categorial error (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 115—130).
Ontological classification: Superordinate concept: Entity; subordinate concepts: Interpersonal Relation, Spatial Extension, Social Role
Ontological relations:
- essentially distinct from: Substance
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Boëthius: Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, cap. 3 (on the distinction between substance and accident in the context of the definition of person).