The basal relations (bR1-bR5) designate the five possible logical relationships between the concept of person and the concept of human being. They clarify the question: Are all human beings persons? Are all persons human beings? (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 96 ff., 126 ff.)
The five relations are:
- bR1 — all human beings are persons and all persons are human beings (human being = person)
- bR2 — all human beings are persons, but not all persons are human beings (human being is a subset of person)
- bR3 — not all human beings are persons and not all persons are human beings (intersection)
- bR4 — all persons are human beings, but not all human beings are persons (person is a subset of human being)
- bR5 — no human being is a person and no person is a human being
The choice of the basal relation has existential consequences. The substance-ontological concept of person leads to bR2: all human beings are persons, but there are also non-human persons (angels, divine persons). The empirical-functionalist concept of person leads to bR3 or bR4. Accordingly, not all human beings are persons (e.g. embryos, human beings with dementia). Singer explicitly holds bR3/bR4 and infers from it that embryos and severely disabled newborns are not persons. The relational concept of person may, depending on its form, imply various relations.
The dissertation holds bR2: every human being is a person — from fertilization onward. This follows from the substance-ontological-relational concept of person and from the principle agere sequitur esse. Spaemann: “There are no potential persons.” Whoever holds bR4 excludes human beings from personal status and thereby from the dignity of the person — a form of oblivion of the person.
Chapter assignment: Chapter 3: What is a person?
Basal Relation
The basal relation designates the set-theoretical relationship between the set of human beings and the set of persons. Five such relations are logically possible (cf. Bexten 2017, ch. 3.3.2—3.3.3). Of these five, the dissertation recognizes and defends the second basal relation (bR2) as the adequate one: all human beings are persons, but not all persons are human beings — the set of human beings is a proper subset of the set of persons. The remaining four relations, among them the claim that not all human beings are persons (bR3, bR4), are rejected as inadequate. This analysis is foundational for the entire ontology of personhood, since it places the question of the relationship between being human and personhood on a precise conceptual basis.
Ontological classification: Chapter reference: ch. 3.3.2—3.3.3
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Spaemann, Robert: Persons. The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’, transl. Oliver O’Donovan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 (on the principle “There are no potential persons”).
- Singer, Peter: Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979/1993 (as a proponent of bR3/bR4: not all human beings are persons).
- Boethius: Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, cap. 3 (on the classical definition of person and its significance for the basal relations).
- Aquinas: Summa Theologiae I, q. 29, a. 1-4 (on the metaphysical deepening of the concept of person).
See also
Concept of Person, Substance-Ontological Concept of Person, Empirical-Functionalist Concept of Person, Relational Concept of Person, Person, Human Person, Personhood, Dignity, Embryo, Dementia, Fertilization, Nature, Oblivion of the Person, Substance, Agere sequitur esse, Someone, Personalistic Norm, First Dimension, Cognition, Insight, Essential Law, Metaphysics, Freedom, Body-Soul Unity, Act and Potency, Person Behavior, Biological Life, Personal Life, Concept, Robert Spaemann, Peter Singer, Boethius, Thomas von Aquin, John Locke, Derek Parfit, David Wiggins, Rene Descartes, Chapter 3: Concept of Person, Chapter 5: Oblivion of the Person, Chapter 4: Personhood