Phenomenology is the philosophical method founded by Edmund Husserl, which demands a return to the “things themselves.” In the dissertation it serves as a methodological approach for deriving the essence of personhood not from preconceived theories but from what shows itself immediately in experience (Bexten 2017, p. 30 ff.). The phenomenological intuition of essences makes possible the cognition of essential laws that hold necessarily and universally — it thus opens the path to metaphysics without lapsing into mere empiricism.
From the book
“Back to the things themselves! This principle means: do not let yourself be guided by theories, systems, or prevailing opinions. Approach the thing itself.”
— Back to the things themselves (German), Chapter 2
Ontological classification: Superordinate concept: Phenomenological Method
Ontological relations:
- contradicts: existentialist phenomenology, transcendental-idealist phenomenology
Existentialist phenomenology
Existentialist phenomenology is that current within phenomenology associated above all with Martin Heidegger. Its focus lies on the analytic of Dasein: on the question of the being of the human as “being-in-the-world,” on temporality, thrownness, and care. In contrast to realistic phenomenology, the central concern is not the intuition of essences of objective essential laws but the analysis of the existential structures of Dasein.
Demarcation from realistic phenomenology
From the perspective of the dissertation (cf. Bexten 2017, ch. 2), existentialist phenomenology is problematic. It turns the gaze away from the cognition of objective truths and narrows it to subjective existential experience. Realistic phenomenology, by contrast, maintains: reality — including personhood — is objectively knowable and not merely a structure of Dasein.
The contradiction (the contradicts relation in the ontology) between the two directions concerns a fundamental question. Does phenomenology lead to genuine insight into consciousness-independent states of affairs? Or does it remain within the horizon of Dasein?
Heidegger’s approach
Heidegger radicalizes the phenomenological question. Instead of asking after the essence of things (what they necessarily are), he asks after the being of beings as such. The person is, for Heidegger, thought not as substance or spiritual substance but as Dasein — a being that relates to its own being.
The dissertation criticizes this approach because it is unable to ground the ontological dignity of the person. If personhood is reduced to existential structures, the ground for the inalienability of ontological dignity is lacking (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 38—42).
The three phenomenological directions
The ontology distinguishes three principal directions of phenomenology, all classified as subclasses of the Phenomenological Method:
- Realistic phenomenology — adherence to the objective intuition of essences and to consciousness-independent reality (Reinach, Scheler, Hildebrand, Seifert)
- Transcendental-idealist phenomenology — Husserl’s later phase: the world as the product of constitutive achievements of consciousness
- Existentialist phenomenology — Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein: a focus on existential structures rather than essential laws
Only realistic phenomenology is recognized by the dissertation as methodologically viable for the question of personhood.
Ontological classification:
- Superordinate concept: Phenomenological Method
Ontological relations:
- contradicts: realistic phenomenology
- siblings: transcendental-idealist phenomenology
Chapter assignment: Chapter 2: How does one think about such questions? (German)
Realistic phenomenology
Realistic phenomenology is that current within phenomenology which holds fast to the objectivity of the intuition of essences and to the knowability of a consciousness-independent reality. In contrast to the transcendental-idealist turn of Husserl after the Ideas (1913), the realistic phenomenologists insist that the phenomenological method leads to genuine cognition of real essential laws and states of affairs — not merely to structures of consciousness.
For the dissertation, realistic phenomenology is of central methodological significance: it makes it possible to grasp personhood as an objective ontological datum that shows itself to experience and is not first constructed by theories (cf. Bexten 2017, p. 30 ff.). The method of “looking carefully” — the prejudice-free reception of what shows itself — forms the epistemological foundation of the entire ontology of the person.
Central representatives of realistic phenomenology who play a role in the book:
- Edmund Husserl (in his early, realistic phase)
- Adolf Reinach
- Max Scheler
- Edith Stein
- Hedwig Conrad-Martius
- Dietrich von Hildebrand
- Josef Seifert
Transcendental-idealist phenomenology
Transcendental-idealist phenomenology denotes Husserl’s later philosophical development from the Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology (1913) onward. In this phase, Husserl no longer understands the world as a reality subsisting in itself, but as the product of constitutive achievements of consciousness. Consciousness constitutes objects rather than finding them. The transcendental reduction (epoché) brackets the natural thesis of the world and leads to “pure consciousness” as absolute being (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 30—39).
From the viewpoint of realistic phenomenology, this step betrays the original program of the “return to the things themselves.” Reinach, Hildebrand, and Seifert criticize the transcendental turn as an illegitimate appropriation of reality by the subject. States of affairs, values, and essences subsist in themselves — they are discovered, not produced.
The dissertation resolutely takes the side of realistic phenomenology and rejects transcendental idealism as a methodological foundation for the ontology of the person (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 32—38).
Ontological relations:
- (inverse) contradicts: realistic phenomenology
- is subclass of: Phenomenological Method
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology. Bexten 2017, pp. 27—55 (On the method of philosophizing).
Further sources:
- Husserl, E.: Logische Untersuchungen (1900/01). Halle: Niemeyer. (Founding of the phenomenological method)
- Husserl, E.: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (1913). (Transcendental-idealist turn)
- Heidegger, M.: Sein und Zeit (1927). Tübingen: Niemeyer. (Existentialist phenomenology and the analytic of Dasein)
- Reinach, A.: Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes (1913). (Realistic phenomenology of a priori states of affairs)
- Scheler, M.: Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (1913/1916). Halle: Niemeyer. (Phenomenology of values)
- Hildebrand, D. von: Ethik (1973). In: Gesammelte Werke, vol. II. Regensburg: Habbel. (Realistic phenomenology and value-response)
- Seifert, Josef (1987): Back to ‘Things in Themselves’. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism. London/New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Defense of realistic phenomenology)
- Stein, E.: Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person (1932/33, ed. 2004). ESGA 14. Herder. (Phenomenological anthropology)
- Conrad-Martius, H.: Das Sein (1957). München: Kösel. (Real Ontology and phenomenology)
See also: