Was den Menschen zum Menschen macht

Alexander of Hales

3 Min. Lesezeit

🇩🇪 Deutsche Version: Alexander von Hales

Alexander of Hales — Franciscan theologian and philosopher of the thirteenth century — expanded the definition of person given by Boethius by a decisive dimension: dignity. He thereby made explicit that the concept of person is a concept of dignity.

Key Contribution

Alexander of Hales defines the person as “hypostasis distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente” — “a self-standing being distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity”. He thereby says: to be a person is not only an ontological fact, but at the same time a fact of dignity. The concept of person is always already a concept of dignity. Whoever says “person” thereby says something about the incomparable perfection and dignity of this being (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 125 ff.).

Central Ideas in the Book

Person as a Matter of Morality

Alexander formulates: “The person is a matter of morality, because it expresses a property of dignity.” He thereby joins ontology and ethics: the being of the person (personhood) immediately grounds the moral demand to respect the person as a someone. The Personalistic Norm — to affirm the person for her own sake — is already prefigured in Alexander.

Development of the Boethian Concept of Person

Alexander takes up Boethius’ definition (naturae rationalis individua substantia) and supplements it with the moment of dignity. Boethius had shown that the person is substance; Alexander shows that this substance as such has dignity. Thomas Aquinas will bring both lines together: the person is the most perfect thing in the whole of nature — hence at once supreme in being and supreme in dignity.

Against the Reduction to Function

If the concept of person is essentially a concept of dignity, then personhood cannot be tied to empirical functions. Dignity does not attach to the actual exercise of reason or self-consciousness, but to the being of the person as substance. An embryo has the dignity of the person — not because it does something, but because it is someone.

Place in the Book

Alexander is drawn upon in the chapter Chapter 3: What Is a Person? (German), where the various historical definitions of person are analyzed. His dignity-determination, together with Boethius’ substance-determination and Thomas’ perfection-determination, forms the foundation of the substance-ontological concept of person.

Sources: Bexten 2017, pp. 125 ff. (Alexander’s development of the Boethian concept of person by the concept of dignity).

Further sources:

  • Summa Theologica, esp. I, no. 405 (person as nomen dignitatis — development of the Boethian definition by the concept of dignity)

See also

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