A future person is a human person who is not yet conceived and therefore does not yet really exist. She is in the mode of possible being (potentia objectiva).
She does not yet possess real personhood and not yet real ontological dignity, since no subject exists in which these could inhere. But: as soon as she is conceived, she immediately and inalienably possesses full personhood (Prote Energeia) and full ontological dignity. The certainty of this future personhood grounds the present ethical duty.
The future person is ontologically disjoint with the currently existing person: the currently existing person really exists and possesses actual personhood; the future person exists only as a possibility. Nevertheless, the currently existing person has an anticipatory responsibility for the future person — she must act today in such a way that the conditions for the good life of future persons are preserved.
This responsibility concerns in particular questions of genetic technology, artificial fertilization, and transhumanism: interventions performed today affect persons who will really exist tomorrow. The Personalist Norm also holds prospectively.
Ontological classification
Ontological relations:
- disjoint with: Currently Existing Person
- hasAnticipatoryResponsibilityFor: Human Person has anticipatory responsibility for Future Person
- mode of being: potentia objectiva (possible being)
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: What is human personhood? (German)
See also
- Person
- Personhood
- Embryo
- Responsibility
- Genetic Technology
- Transhumanism
- Act and Potency
- Contingency
- Thomas Aquinas
- Robert Spaemann
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
References: Bexten 2017, pp. 195 ff. (personhood and modes of being).