The mode of being (the manner of being) designates the way in which something exists — not merely that it exists. The dissertation shows that personhood is a particular mode of being: the form of existence of an individual spiritual substance (Bexten 2017, pp. 134 ff.). Personhood is accordingly not a feature that is added to an already existing being, but the fundamental way in which the human person exists. The distinction of different modes of being is central to metaphysics: a stone, a plant, an animal, and a person each exist in a different mode of being.
Ontological classification: Superordinate concept: Being; subordinate concepts: Ideal Being, Possible Being, Real Being, Intentional Being
Ideal Being
Ideal being is the mode of being of timeless objects: numbers, essences, logical truths, and necessary states of affairs. It is disjoint from real being and from possible being (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 58 ff.).
Seifert, following Husserl and realist phenomenology, shows that ideal objects are neither invented nor constructed. The principle of non-contradiction holds regardless of whether anyone thinks it. Numbers do not exist in space and time, yet they are nevertheless not nothing — they possess a manner of being of their own. Ideal being is immutable, necessary, and timeless. Real being, by contrast, is contingent and temporally constituted.
For epistemology this distinction is fundamental. The person cognizes ideal objects through intellectual insight, not through sense perception. The capacity to grasp ideal being attests to the spiritual nature of the person. In the act of cognition the person transcends the merely material and temporal.
Ontological relations:
- is disjoint with: Possible Being
- is subclass of: Mode of Being
- (inverse) is disjoint with: Real Being
Possible Being
Being in the sense of conceivability (potentia objectiva); logical freedom from contradiction without real existence. Possible being is one of the modes of being distinguished by Roman Ingarden: it designates that which is thinkable without really existing. It stands in contrast to real being and ideal being.
For personal ontology the distinction between possible and real being is central: a future person is in the mode of possible being — it does not yet really exist and therefore does not yet possess real personhood or real ontological dignity. As soon as it is conceived, however, it passes from possible into real being and immediately and inalienably possesses full personhood. There are no potential persons — only possible future ones and really existing ones (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 170–175).
Ontological classification:
- Superordinate concept: Mode of Being
Ontological relations:
- disjoint with: Real Being, Ideal Being
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
See also: Being, Entity, Mode of Being, Absolute Being, Potency, Person, Form of Existence, Roman Ingarden
Intentional Being
Intentional being is that mode of being in which an entity exists only as the correlate of intentional acts of consciousness: as an ontologically heteronomous, ontologically derived formation. Roman Ingarden analyzed this mode systematically and extended the ontology of realist phenomenology beyond the classical threefold division real/ideal/possible. Ingarden’s paradigmatic example is the literary work of art (the title of his major work of 1931): a purely intentional object that owes its existence exclusively to the acts of consciousness of its author and its readers. Further examples are the characters of literary works, fictional objects, merely imagined contents, and the intentional correlates of mere acts of consciousness. They are not nothing, but they exist neither really (like the body and soul of the person) nor ideally (like numbers and essences) nor merely possibly (like future persons before their fertilization).
Characteristic is the twofold dependence: that which exists intentionally owes its being exclusively to the acts of a consciousness, and it is derived from what that consciousness grasps or projects. It exists as long as and insofar as a subject means, thinks, or imagines it. In this it differs fundamentally from ideal being, whose validity (for instance that of a mathematical proposition) is timeless and independent of consciousness.
For personal ontology the distinction from intentional being is decisive: the human person exists in the mode of real being, not as the intentional correlate of a consciousness. Whoever reduces the person to a merely intentional construct — say, to a “narrative,” a social ascription, or a projection — misses the ontological independence of personhood. Likewise, the right to life of the person must not be confused with merely intentional states of affairs: it belongs to ideal being (an objectively valid norm), while the person herself exists really (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 56 ff.).
Ontological classification:
- Superordinate concept: Mode of Being
Ontological relations:
- is disjoint with: Real Being, Ideal Being, Possible Being
See also: Intentionality, Roman Ingarden, Edmund Husserl
Real Being
Real being is the mode of being of that which actually exists — of those entities that actually subsist in space and time or as spiritual reality (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 56 ff.).
Seifert clearly distinguishes real being from ideal being and from possible being. Ideal objects (numbers, essences) hold timelessly. Possible entities are not yet realized. Real being, by contrast, is characterized by actual existence. A real entity is, it acts and is acted upon, it stands in causal relations.
Persons exist in the mode of real being. They are actual, individual substances, not mere possibilities or abstract essences. Thomas Aquinas determines the actus essendi as the innermost core of real being: the act of being through which an entity actually is. This distinction of the modes of being is methodologically fundamental because it prevents entities of different kinds from being confused with one another.
Ontological relations:
- is subclass of: Mode of Being
- is disjoint with: Ideal Being
- is disjoint with: Possible Being
See also:
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology. Bexten 2017, pp. 169–179 (mode of being and form of existence).
Further sources:
- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 3, a. 4 (actus essendi as the innermost core of real being)
- Seifert, Josef (1987): Back to ‘Things in Themselves’. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism. London/New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (distinction of real, ideal, and possible being)
- Husserl, Edmund: Logische Untersuchungen (1900/01). Halle: Niemeyer. (foundation of the realist phenomenology of ideal objects)
- Ingarden, Roman: Das literarische Kunstwerk (1931). Halle: Niemeyer. (paradigmatic analysis of intentional being in the literary work)
- Ingarden, Roman: Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt (1964/65). Tübingen: Niemeyer. (systematic distinction of the modes of being)