Death is the end of the bodily existence of the person. It marks the end of the lifespan and is to be understood as an event, not as a process. The process is dying. The ontology leaves open the question of a continued existence of the spiritual substance after death.
As the counterpole to conception, death forms the other boundary of earthly personhood. The dignity of the person holds without restriction until death. The reverence shown to the deceased testifies that the person remains in memory as someone, not as something.
Ontological classification: Superordinate concepts: event, process; marks the end of: lifespan, postnatal phase
More recent differentiation: criteria of death
Since its 2026 extension, the ontology systematically distinguishes between death itself and its diagnostic thresholds. A criterion of death is a normative-medical stipulation that determines under which empirically testable conditions a human being counts as dead. It must be distinguished categorially from death itself — the criterion is the threshold, death the ontological event.
Two main forms are distinguished: the cardiopulmonary criterion of death (classical, before 1968) and the brain-based criterion of death (since Harvard 1968). The brain-based criterion has three subforms: the whole-brain death concept (USA, Germany), the brainstem death concept (UK), and the never-established higher-brain death concept (Veatch).
The diagnostic determination proceeds via clinical and instrument-based irreversibility diagnostic procedures — for instance the apnea test. These yield a medically diagnosed irreversibility, not the ontological irreversibility of the separation of body and spiritual substance.
Heart-lung machine
The heart-lung machine is a medical device that mechanically takes over the pumping and ventilating function of heart and lungs. In cases of irreversible loss of brain function it is the central form of mechanical life support. From a personal-ontological perspective, the heart-lung machine raises fundamental questions. As long as the body exists as an ensouled body, the person is alive. The mechanical maintenance of vital functions, however, can blur the boundary between personhood and the mere preservation of functions. The question of employing or terminating mechanical life support directly touches the dignity of the person and the Personalist Norm.
Ontological classification: Superordinate concept: mechanical life support
Irreversible loss of brain function
Irreversible loss of brain function (so-called brain death) denotes the complete and irrevocable failure of all brain functions. It is, however, not to be equated with the certain death of the person. As long as the affected person is kept alive by mechanical life support, she continues to live. Personhood and ontological dignity remain fully intact. What is affected is exclusively the Deutera Energeia (the exercise of functions), not the Prote Energeia (the first actuality of personhood).
The distinction between the failure of functions and the loss of personhood is ontologically decisive. Personhood is grounded in the First Dimension, which does not depend on the actual exercise of cognitive faculties. Irreversible loss of brain function requires mechanical life support for continued life. This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Necessary, because without it certain death ensues. Not sufficient, because even with mechanical support the organism can fail.
See also: Mechanical life support, Personhood, Dignity, Severe dementia, Illness, First Dimension, Medical care, Palliative care
- State
- Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
- Peter Singer
Mechanical life support
Mechanical life support denotes the technical maintenance of the bodily vital functions of a person by medical devices, such as the heart-lung machine or a ventilator. In cases of irreversible loss of brain function, mechanical life support is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for continued life: necessary, because without it certain death ensues; not sufficient, because even with mechanical support the organism can fail.
Mechanical life support is a subform of medical care and as such is subject to the Personalist Norm. The person who is kept alive by machines remains undiminished in her personhood and her dignity. The decision about employing or terminating mechanical life support touches fundamental questions of personal dignity.
See also: Irreversible loss of brain function, Medical care, Palliative care, Personhood, Dignity, Body, Personalist Norm
- Heart-lung machine
- Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
Palliative care
Palliative care is that form of medical care which aims at the relief of suffering and at accompaniment in dying when healing is no longer possible. It affirms personhood until the last moment and preserves the dignity of the dying person. Palliative care shows in a special way that personhood does not depend on capability or performance.
Palliative care is a concrete embodiment of the Personalist Norm in the face of death: it acknowledges that the person remains a person even in dying and is to be affirmed for her own sake. It stands in opposition to every form of active euthanasia, which instrumentalizes or negates the personhood of the dying.
See also: Medical care, Suffering, Personhood, Dignity, Personalist Norm, Illness, Mechanical life support
- Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
Dying
Dying is the process that ends with the event of death. It is a temporally extended process in which the bodily vital functions are extinguished. The central ontological statement is: even in dying, the person remains a person. Personhood is inalienable. The dying human being is not “less human” or “less of a person.” Until the last moment of his bodily existence he is a person with inalienable dignity.
This insight has immediate consequences for the ethical assessment of the treatment of the dying and for the question of the Personalist Norm at the end of life.
Ontological classification: Superordinate concept: process; ends with: death
See also:
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology. Bexten 2017, pp. 24, 105, 191, 197, 207, 209, 216–217, 239, 254 (death and personhood).
Further sources:
- Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, I, q. 76, a. 1 (the soul as form of the body and its separation in death)
- Singer, Peter (1979/1993): Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Opposing position: the concept of person tied to functions of consciousness)