Actuality (actus, Greek energeia) is the counterpart to possibility (potency). An entity is actual insofar as it is — not merely insofar as it could be. The distinction between actuality and possibility belongs to the most fundamental insights of philosophy and goes back to Aristotle.
For the question of personhood, the concept of actuality is of central importance. The human being is not merely a person in potency — he is one actually, from the very beginning. His personhood is not a mere disposition that would first have to be realized through certain capacities, but a given form of actuality: the fundamental spiritual existence of the First Dimension.
Thomas Aquinas understands the actus essendi — the act of being — as the innermost actuality of every entity. What a thing is is determined by its form; that it is, by its act of being. In the case of the person, this act of being is a spiritual one: the person exists as a spiritual substance whose actuality cannot be reduced to the material.
The ontology distinguishes two grades of actuality. The First Actuality (prote energeia) is the substance as such: the person in her fundamental being, which harbors within itself the possibility of a multitude of further actualizations. The person is prote energeia. She is not the result of a change, but of a coming-to-be (Spaemann/Aristotle). The Second Actuality (deutera energeia) is the exercise of the activities and faculties that are laid down in the First Actuality: actual thinking, willing, loving.
The fundamental form of actuality of the human person — spiritual substance-being in the body (Conrad-Martius: hypokeimenal pneumatic being) — unfolds in three dimensions. The First Dimension is the not-yet-conscious personhood (e.g. zygote, embryo). The Second Dimension is the rationally-affectively conscious and volitionally free being. The Third Dimension is the moral perfection through cognition, virtue and love (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 137–200).
Chapter assignment: 4.6 Actuality and Possibility
Motion
Motion (kinēsis / motus) is the actualization of that which exists in potency, insofar as it is in potency (cf. Aristotle, Phys. III 1). It is the generic term for all kinds of change: locomotion, qualitative change (alloiōsis), growth (auxēsis), and substantial change (genesis / phthora).
In the context of the personhood ontology, motion is significant as a subclass of process. The human person develops bodily, from embryo to adult, passing through various life phases. For the person, substantial change concerns conception (coming-to-be) and death (the passing away of bodily existence).
Ontological classification: Generic term: process; subordinate terms: locomotion, qualitative change, growth, substantial change
Developmental Process
A developmental process is a process of the actualization of potencies, in particular the transition between the dimensions of personhood. The human person develops: from embryo through childhood to adulthood, from the First through the Second to the Third Dimension.
This development, however, concerns only the deutera energeia, the unfolding of the acts of activity. It does not concern the prote energeia, the act of being. The person does not become “more of a person” through the developmental process. She actualizes what is laid down within her as active potency. The dimensional transition and the awakening of consciousness are the most important developmental processes of the personhood ontology.
Ontological classification: Generic term: process; subordinate terms: dimensional transition, awakening of consciousness
Process
A process is a temporally extended occurrence that unfolds in phases. Processes have temporal parts. Substances, by contrast, are present as wholes in every moment of their existence (endurantism). Examples of processes are: biological development, the actualization of a potency, personal encounter.
The personhood ontology distinguishes various kinds of processes. Events are temporally bounded and complete (e.g. conception, death). States are temporally extended and homogeneous (e.g. sleep). To these are added developmental processes (the actualization of potencies) and biological processes. Motion (kinēsis) in the Aristotelian sense is likewise a subclass of process.
Ontological classification: Generic term: entity; subordinate terms: event, state, developmental process, biological process, motion
Qualitative Change
Qualitative change (Greek alloiōsis, Latin alteratio) denotes the change in the constitution of an entity without the substance itself changing. It is one of the four Aristotelian-Thomistic kinds of motion and concerns the accidental properties of an entity.
For the person, qualitative change means that her constitution can change — for instance in the learning of new abilities, in the maturation of character, or in bodily illness — while she persists as the same substance. This distinction is central to personalist ontology: the person remains, through all qualitative changes, the same someone with the same dignity. Qualitative change differs essentially from substantial change, in which a substance comes to be or passes away.
Ontological Classification
Generic term: Motion
Ontological relations:
- changes: accidental properties
- preserves: substance
Substantial Change
Substantial change (Greek genesis / phthora, Latin generatio / corruptio) denotes the coming-to-be or passing away of a substance. In contrast to qualitative change, which concerns only accidental properties, and to growth, which alters quantity, here it is a matter of the being or non-being of the substance itself.
For the person, the two decisive substantial changes are conception and death: at conception a new personal substance comes to be with full personhood and full dignity; at death the bodily-spiritual unity passes away. Substantial change shows the contingency of the person as a created entity: she has a beginning and — in her bodily existence — an end. Precisely in this she differs from Absolute Being, which is subject to no change.
Ontological Classification
Generic term: Motion
Ontological relations:
- concerns: substance (coming-to-be/passing away)
- examples for the person: conception, death
Growth
Growth (Greek auxēsis, Latin augmentatio) denotes the quantitative increase of an entity. In the context of the person it means bodily growth from embryo to adult. It is one of the four Aristotelian-Thomistic kinds of motion and concerns quantity, not the substance or the quality of the entity.
The bodily growth of the person belongs to the First Dimension of personhood and is accomplished as a continuous process in which the same personal substance unfolds. The person who begins to exist as an embryo is the same person who stands before us as an adult — her personhood and her dignity do not change through growth. Rather, growth shows the dynamism of personal life: the person is not static but unfolds bodily in time.
Ontological Classification
Generic term: Motion
Ontological relations:
- concerns: quantity of the entity
- belongs to: First Dimension
State
A state is a temporally extended, homogeneous process without inner change during its duration. Examples are sleep, unconsciousness, or the state of the First Dimension. A state takes place during an interval of time and can be ended or initiated by an event.
For personalist ontology, the category of state is significant because it shows that personhood persists undiminished even in states of reduced actualization — such as sleep, unconsciousness, or dementia. The dignity of the person does not depend on the state in which she finds herself, but is grounded in her personhood itself. Moral perfection and captivity are likewise modeled as states, which illustrates the breadth of this category — from the highest to the most oppressive.
Ontological Classification
Generic term: process
Subclasses: moral perfection, captivity
Ontological relations:
- takes place during: interval
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Aristotle: Metaphysics, IX (Theta), 1–10 (actuality and possibility: energeia and dynamis)
- Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 4 (actus essendi as the innermost actuality of the entity)
- Conrad-Martius, Hedwig (1957): Das Sein. Munich: Kösel. (German) (hypokeimenal pneumatic being)
- Spaemann, Robert: Persons. The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’. Translated by Oliver O’Donovan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. (the person as the result of a coming-to-be, not of a change)
Ontological classification:
- Generic term: Being
- Contrary term: Potency (possibility)
- Subordinate forms: First Actuality (prote energeia), Second Actuality (deutera energeia)
- is superclass of: Act
- Act is subclass of: Life, Act and Potency