Esse naturale is the scholastic term for the natural mode of being of a thing in the reality that lies outside the mind. The horse in the meadow has esse naturale: it exists really, with matter and form, prior to and independently of cognition. The counter-concept is esse intentionale — the mode of being of the same form in the cognizing mind.
Thomas Aquinas introduces this distinction in Summa theologiae I, q. 78–85 and in his commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. It is the ontological background of the scholastic doctrine of cognition: cognition is possible because the same form can be in two modes — naturally in the thing, intentionally in the mind. Without this distinction, cognition would remain either duplication (representationalism) or mere effect (sensualism).
Esse naturale is not the only being outside the mind. The personhood ontology distinguishes further modes of being: absolute, ideal, real, and intentional being according to Roman Ingarden. Esse naturale largely coincides with what Ingarden analyzes as real being: temporal, spatio-temporally located, causally interwoven.
The distinction gains special significance in the question of original and derived intentionality: whatever takes in something original unites esse naturale (the real thing) and esse intentionale (the form in the mind) in a single act of cognition. A symbol-processing system without mind, by contrast, merely moves tokens — it has neither the esse naturale of the thing (it does not reach the horse) nor esse intentionale (there is no taking-in).
Ontological classification: Superordinate concept: mode of being; counter-concept: esse intentionale.
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae I, qq. 78–85. Transl. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Bros., 1947; Sentencia libri De anima, lib. III.
- Ingarden, Roman (1964): Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt. Tübingen: Niemeyer (German).