Solipsism (Lat. solus ipse — only I myself) designates the philosophical thesis that only one’s own I with its contents of consciousness really exists. Other persons, the external world, nature — all this could be mere appearance, a projection of one’s own consciousness.
For interpersonality, solipsism is the radical counter-position: if there is no real Thou, there is no love, no affirmation, no promise, no dialogue — everything that constitutes personhood in the third dimension becomes impossible. The Communio Personarum presupposes that other persons really exist — not as constructions of my consciousness, but as someone with an inner life of their own.
A consequence of positivism
Max Planck showed that consistent positivism ends in “unreasonable solipsism”: if only one’s own sense impressions count as a source of knowledge and nothing may be assumed behind them, there is no reason to believe in the existence of an external world or of other persons. Natural science itself, however, presupposes the existence of a real world independent of the observer — positivism undermines its own foundation.
Phenomenological refutation
Realist phenomenology refutes solipsism by exhibiting empathy: in the experience of the other, a foreign consciousness shows itself immediately, one that cannot be derived from my own. Edith Stein showed in her dissertation Zum Problem der Einfühlung (On the Problem of Empathy, 1917) that the experience of the foreign I is an independent, irreducible act of cognition. The other is not inferred but given — as someone, not as a mere something.
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood (German), Chapter 5: Oblivion of the Person (German)
Ontological classification: Subclass of: Theoretical Oblivion of the Person. Contradicts: Interpersonality, Personhood.
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology. Bexten 2017, pp. 218–254 (theoretical oblivion of the person).
Further sources:
- Planck, Max (1937): „Religion und Naturwissenschaft”. In: Planck, Max: Vorträge und Erinnerungen. Stuttgart: Hirzel, 1949.
- Stein, Edith (1917): Zum Problem der Einfühlung. Halle: Buchdruckerei des Waisenhauses. — New edition in: ESGA 5. Freiburg: Herder, 2008.