The state of affairs (Sachverhalt) is the that-something-is-so: an independent ontological type that can be reduced neither to things nor to sentences nor to judgments. In his investigation On the Theory of the Negative Judgment (1911), Reinach showed that states of affairs subsist objectively — independently of whether anyone cognizes or articulates them. The state of affairs “that this rose is red” is distinct from the rose, distinct from the sentence, and distinct from the judgment that affirms it. There are also negative states of affairs (the not-being-F of x), there are infinitely many states of affairs, and states of affairs can concern all modes of being (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 30–55).
State of Affairs as Archphenomenon
States of affairs are archphenomena — something intellectually ultimate that cannot be traced back any further to something simpler. They can be exhibited, but not derived from other givens. They possess a predicative structure: the being-F of x. An object saturates the predicative component. This mode of being — subsisting (obtinere) — is categorially distinct from the existence of things: things exist, states of affairs subsist (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 38–46).
State of Affairs and Judgment
The state of affairs is the objective correlate of the judgment — that upon which the judgment is directed. Reinach shows: the judgment discovers the state of affairs, it does not produce it. The state of affairs “that this rose is red” subsists whether or not anyone affirms it. In the compositio et divisio (Thomas Aquinas), the intellect directs itself upon a state of affairs by ascribing something to a thing or denying it of it. Only in the judgment does truth or falsity become possible — and with it also error.
State of Affairs and Truth
States of affairs are the foundation of truth: a statement is true if and only if the state of affairs it asserts agrees with the state of affairs subsisting in actuality. This formulation makes more precise the well-known Thomistic formula veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei: it determines what on the side of the intellect (intellectus) agrees — namely the asserted state of affairs — and what on the side of the thing (res) — namely the subsisting state of affairs. Aristotle formulates the principle: “It is not because we think truly that you are pale, that you are pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth” (Metaphysics IX, 10). Actuality determines truth, not the reverse.
State of Affairs and Cognition
States of affairs are the proper object of cognition. In cognition the mind grasps not merely individual things, but states of affairs — that something is so and cannot be otherwise. Essential intuition (eidetic intuition) discloses a priori states of affairs: states of affairs that are grounded in the essence of their objects and therefore hold necessarily. Seifert emphasizes that these states of affairs are not constructed but discovered — the intellect has access to “intrinsically necessary and intelligible essences” that exist autonomously “in themselves.”
Reinach formulates: “A priori states of affairs are grounded in the nature or essence of their underlying objects.” Thus it lies, for instance, in the essence of motion to have a substrate — that is an a priori state of affairs which holds in every possible world.
State of Affairs and Actuality
States of affairs rest on actuality — they subsist in it, independently of the cognizing subject. This is the decisive point of realist phenomenology against every form of idealism: states of affairs are not products of consciousness, but structures of actuality itself, which the mind can discover. Husserl spoke of “categorial intuition” (kategoriale Anschauung) as the faculty through which states of affairs become accessible — a form of intuition that goes beyond sensory perception.
Subsisting and Non-Subsisting States of Affairs
Reinach defends the existence of genuine negative states of affairs: the not-being-F of x is just as much a state of affairs as the being-F of x. Since only states of affairs possess predicative structure, there are no negative objects, no negative essences, no negative qualities — but there are indeed negative states of affairs. A non-subsisting state of affairs is a genuine entity, not merely nothing.
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein distinguishes three categories: the Sachverhalt (state of affairs) as a possible configuration of simple objects, the Tatsache (fact) as the subsisting of states of affairs (“The world is the totality of facts, not of things”), and the Sachlage (situation) as a more comprehensive space of possibility.
State of Affairs in Personal Ontology
For the question of personhood, the concept of the state of affairs is of fundamental importance. Personhood itself is not a state of affairs, but a mode of being — the form of reality of the person. It is, however, an a priori state of affairs that this human being is a person: it lies in the essence of the human being to be a person, and this state of affairs subsists independently of whether it is acknowledged by others. The oblivion of the person fails to recognize not an opinion, but this state of affairs — and thereby actuality itself.
Ontological classification:
- Superordinate concept: Archphenomenon
Ontological relations:
- is correlate of: Judgment
- is foundation of: Truth
- rests on: Actuality
- is object of: Cognition, Essential Intuition
Chapter assignment: Chapter 2: How does one think about such questions?
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Reinach, Adolf (1911): “Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils” (German). In: Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen. Leipzig (state of affairs as an independent ontological type)
- Husserl, Edmund: Logical Investigations, transl. J. N. Findlay. London/New York: Routledge 2001 (state of affairs and categorial intuition)
- Seifert, Josef (1987): Back to ‘Things in Themselves’. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism. London/New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul (a priori states of affairs and essential intuition)
- Aristotle: Metaphysics IX, 10 (truth and actuality)
- Aquinas, Thomas: Summa Theologiae I, q. 16, a. 2 (truth in the judgment)
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1921): Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (state of affairs, fact, situation)