The philosophical method of the work — more precisely: the method by which the ontology of the person is disclosed. Within phenomenology, however, there is not one unified method but three fundamentally different, mutually contradictory directions that go by the same name. This distinction is decisive, because the choice of phenomenological direction determines the entire ontology.
The three directions are:
(1) Realistic phenomenology, represented by Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and Josef Seifert. It assumes that the phenomena which show themselves to consciousness are aspects of a consciousness-independent reality. Here the intuition of essences grasps real essences and essential laws.
(2) Existentialist phenomenology (Heidegger, Sartre). It radically reformulates the question of being and asserts the precedence of existence over essence.
(3) Transcendental-idealist phenomenology (Husserl in his later phase). It traces all reality back to the constitutive achievements of transcendental consciousness.
The dissertation places itself resolutely within the tradition of realistic phenomenology. Only in this direction can one meaningfully speak of an ontology of the person. For ontology asks after the being of things, not merely after their modes of appearing in consciousness.
Realistic phenomenology is compatible with Thomistic metaphysics and complements it. Thomas Aquinas analyzes the principles of being of the person (actus essendi, act and potency, substance and accident). The phenomenological method discloses the essences and essential laws that show themselves in concrete experience.
The phenomenological method requires that the one who knows turn to the things themselves — without prejudices, without reduction to predetermined categories. The cognition of archphenomena such as dignity, justice, or love is possible only in this attitude of openness.
Ontological classification
- has subclasses (three directions): realistic phenomenology, existentialist phenomenology, transcendental-idealist phenomenology
Ontological relations:
- has subclass: realistic phenomenology
- has subclass: existentialist phenomenology
- has subclass: transcendental-idealist phenomenology
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology. Bexten 2017, pp. 27—55 (Method of philosophizing).
Further sources:
- Husserl, E.: Logische Untersuchungen (1900/01). Halle: Niemeyer. (Grounding of the phenomenological method)
- Reinach, A.: Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes (1913). (Realistic phenomenology)
- Hildebrand, D. von: Ethik (1973). In: Gesammelte Werke, vol. II. Regensburg: Habbel. (Realistic phenomenology and value theory)
- Seifert, Josef (1987): Back to ‘Things in Themselves’. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism. London/New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Defense of realistic phenomenology)
- Heidegger, M.: Sein und Zeit (1927). Tübingen: Niemeyer. (Existentialist phenomenology)
- Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae I, q. 75—89. (Metaphysics of the person, complementary to phenomenology)
See also:
- Chapter 2: Method (German)
- Person
- Essential Law
- Metaphysics