The irreducible dimension of temporality as such — the archphenomenon of all phenomena (Husserl). The absolute stream of consciousness is self-appearing and self-constituting: it requires no further stream in order to grasp itself.
Ingarden emphasizes: ‘Time is far more fundamental than space.’ Temporality differentiates all four modes of being (absolute, ideal, real, intentional being). Conrad-Martius distinguishes aeonic and apeiric time. Time as an irreducible dimension is to be strictly distinguished from the temporal entity, which encompasses the things in time — instants and intervals.
Temporal entity
Temporal entity is the superclass for instants and intervals. It forms the foundation for the temporal registration of personhood in the ontology.
The temporal dimension is of fundamental significance for the person. The person exists in time, has a beginning (conception) and lives through various life phases. The distinction between instant and interval makes it possible to register precisely both punctual events (such as conception or death) and extended processes (such as growth or a life phase).
The temporal entity, together with the spatial entity, forms the categorial framework within which the bodily life of the person takes place.
Ontological classification
Superordinate concept: Entity
Temporal attribution
Temporal attribution is a reified relation that links a property attribution to an interval. It allows the ontology to express: “Subject has property P during interval T”. This modeling pattern is necessary in order to register the temporal dimension of personhood formally.
The temporal attribution links a subject, a property, and an interval. It has various subclasses. The capability attribution states that a particular capability holds during an interval. The dimensional state states that a person is in a particular dimension during an interval. The normative state registers, for instance, that a person is being instrumentalized during an interval.
This differentiation makes it possible to register precisely the changes in a person’s life without calling into question the person’s unchangeable personhood and dignity.
Ontological classification
Superordinate concept: Entity
Subclasses: Capability Attribution, Dimensional State, Normative State
Ontological relations:
Instant
An instant is an extensionless point in time. Together with the interval, it forms the two subclasses of the temporal entity. Instant and interval are disjoint: an instant has no duration.
For the person, certain instants mark decisive turning points of her life: the instant of conception, from which she exists and possesses full personhood, and the instant of death, at which her bodily existence ends. An instant can have a concrete calendrical value and serves as the beginning or end of an interval. The temporal determinateness of the person — her beginning at a particular instant — attests her contingency as a created entity.
Ontological classification
Superordinate concept: Temporal Entity
Ontological relations:
Interval
An interval is a temporal stretch with positive duration. Together with the instant, it forms the two subclasses of the temporal entity.
Every interval has a beginning and an end, each modeled as instants. Intervals can stand in manifold temporal relations to one another: they can lie before one another, adjoin one another, overlap, or be contained in one another. For the person, intervals are the basic structure of her temporal existence: the life phases — the prenatal phase, childhood, adulthood — are intervals in which personhood unfolds in its various dimensions. Temporal attribution links properties of the person to the interval during which they hold.
Ontological classification
Superordinate concept: Temporal Entity
Ontological relations:
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
References: Bexten 2017, pp. 32—34 (time-consciousness and phenomenology).
Further sources:
- Ingarden, Roman (1964): Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt. Vol. I. Tübingen: Niemeyer. (German) (“Time is far more fundamental than space”)
- Husserl, Edmund (1928): Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. Halle: Niemeyer. (German)
- Conrad-Martius, Hedwig (1954): Die Zeit. Munich: Kösel. (German)
Ontological relations:
- is subclass of: Archphenomenon
See also:
- Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
- Aristotle