The unrepeatability and irreplaceability of every human person. Whereas individuality names the qualitative distinctiveness, uniqueness emphasizes the fact that no person can be replaced or represented by another. Hildebrand: “In love we experience the uniqueness of the beloved person most deeply — he is not interchangeable.” Uniqueness is grounded in ontological dignity and in irreducible personhood (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 137–145).
Uniqueness and the Character of Being Someone
The character of being a someone is the immediate expression of the person’s uniqueness. A someone is neither representable nor replaceable — unlike a something, which can be substituted by an equivalent specimen. Spaemann: “If someone is someone, this means: he is a person. Whoever is someone always was so.” Uniqueness is not a property that the person first acquires; it belongs to her being from the very beginning — already as an embryo, already prior to any conscious experience.
Uniqueness as the Ground of the Personalist Norm
Uniqueness grounds the personalist norm: because every person is irreplaceable, she may never be used as a mere means. The person is to be affirmed for her own sake — not on account of her achievement, her usefulness, or her properties, but because she is this person and no other can replace her. Uniqueness is at the same time the refutation of every collectivist or utilitarian reductionism that treats persons as fungible units.
Uniqueness and Ontological Dignity
Uniqueness is grounded in ontological dignity: because the person has a dignity that admits of no degrees and no relativization, she is unique in the strict sense. Ontological dignity in turn grounds uniqueness, and uniqueness manifests dignity — the two reciprocally condition each other.
Uniqueness and Individuality
Uniqueness presupposes individuality. Only because every person has an unmistakable distinctiveness (individuality) can she be irreplaceable in the strict sense (uniqueness). Conversely, individuality presupposes uniqueness. Qualitative distinctiveness has ontological weight only because the person is not interchangeable. Both essential characteristics refer to one another and belong to the first dimension of personhood.
Ontological classification:
- Superordinate term: essential characteristic
- Related terms: individuality, someone, dignity
Ontological relations:
- presupposes: individuality
- grounds: personalist norm
- is grounded in: ontological dignity
- is captured by: substance-ontological-relational concept of person
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: What is human personhood? (esp. 4.2.2, 4.7.3), Chapter 3: What is a person?
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Hildebrand, D. von: Das Wesen der Liebe (1971). Regensburg: Josef Habbel. (German) (uniqueness of the beloved in love)
- Spaemann, R.: Persons. The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’, transl. O. O’Donovan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. (the someone-character and the non-substitutability of the person)