The naturalistic fallacy (naturalistic fallacy) was formulated by George Edward Moore (1873—1958) in Principia Ethica (1903): “good” cannot be defined in natural properties. Closely related to it is the is-ought fallacy (Hume’s Law) claimed by David Hume (1711—1776): from a judgment of being no judgment of ought can be derived. Both theses form the foundation of the modern separation of is and ought, and they are criticized in detail in the book (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 115—116, 232, 240—241).
From the book
“Is the gulf between is and ought claimed by David Hume (1711—1776) justified in principle? Is the so-called naturalistic fallacy claimed by George Edward Moore (1873—1958) valid in principle?”
— Examples of the Various Perspectives, Chapter 3 (German)
The core question
At its core, the question is: does the being of the human being have a normative force? Does what the human being is also say something about how it ought to be treated?
Whoever claims with Hume that one cannot infer the ought from being must explain why anything for the treatment of someone should follow from the fact that they are a person. And whoever recognizes the naturalistic fallacy as valid must explain how moral obligations can be derived from the nature of a being at all (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 115—116).
Rejection by the Personhood ontology
The dissertation rejects both fallacies. Its argument proceeds in several steps:
1. There is no value-free nature. Both fallacies rest on a positivistically narrowed concept of nature, which conceives nature as a value-free domain of pure facts. Yet this concept of nature is an unproven premise: “Secondly, the is/ought fallacy could fail to be a fallacy because there is no domain of pure being — that is, no value-free nature — at all, or because at least some things in nature have an intrinsic value.” (Keil 2005, p. 85f.; cf. Bexten 2017, p. 240).
2. Ontological dignity is an objective value in being. The personhood of the human being is significant and value-laden in itself. Ontological dignity is not an ought added subsequently to being, but a archphenomenon grounded in the being of the person itself. The Personalist Norm is the only adequate value-response to this being — not a duty imposed from outside (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 232, 240).
3. Moore’s fallacy is itself a fallacy. William K. Frankena (1908—1994) showed that the so-called naturalistic fallacy is no genuine naturalistic fallacy, but an informal definist fallacy: the error lies not in the inference from nature to value, but in the confusion of two properties — in defining one property by another (cf. Frankena 1939, pp. 467—475; Bexten 2017, p. 241).
4. The charge of speciesism is a related fallacy. Günther Pöltner showed in Menschennatur und Speziesismus (2015) that Peter Singer’s speciesism objection misses the substance-ontological concept of person: it presupposes that this concept ties personhood to mere biological membership in the species — in fact it ties it to the having of a rational, bodily-constituted nature. The objection at most hits a naturalistic fallacy that the Thomistic-personalist tradition precisely rejects.
Is-ought fallacy (Hume’s Law)
David Hume formulated the thesis that from a judgment of being (“is”) no judgment of ought (“ought”) can be derived. This so-called Hume’s Law became the foundation of the modern separation of facts and values. Within the framework of the Personhood ontology this separation is rejected as an expression of a theoretical oblivion of the person: it disregards that the moral ought is a archphenomenon that need not be derived from anything else, and that objective values belong to the being of reality itself (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 115, 240).
Positivistic concept of nature
The common presupposition of both fallacies is a positivistic concept of nature: the view that nature is a value-free domain of pure facts. Wolfgang Waldstein showed that this narrowed concept of nature concludes “from a positivistically narrowed concept of nature to the non-existence of ideal givens in nature” — “this self-contradictory doctrine fails to notice that it thereby, by compelling consequence, also pulls the ground out from under all human cognition whatsoever” (Waldstein 1992, p. 138; cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 115—116).
Definist fallacy
William K. Frankena (1908—1994) showed in his influential 1939 analysis that Moore’s so-called naturalistic fallacy is no genuine naturalistic fallacy. “The definist fallacy is the process of confusing or identifying two properties, of defining one property by another, or of substituting one property for another” (Frankena 1939, pp. 467—475). The actual error therefore lies not in the inference from is to ought, but in a confusion at the level of definition (cf. Bexten 2017, p. 241).
Ontological classification:
- Superordinate concept: Theoretical Oblivion of the Person
- Subordinate concepts: Is-ought fallacy (Hume’s Law), Definist fallacy (Frankena’s correction)
Ontological relations:
- rests on: Positivistic concept of nature
- is rejected by: Objective Value, Ontological Dignity, Moral Ought
- violates norm: Personalist Norm
Chapter assignment: Chapter 3: The Concept of Person (German), Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Moore, George Edward: Principia Ethica (1903). Cambridge University Press. (on the formulation of the naturalistic fallacy)
- Hume, David: A Treatise of Human Nature (1739/40). Book III, Part I. (on the is-ought fallacy)
- Frankena, William K. (1939): “The Naturalistic Fallacy”. Mind 48(192), pp. 464—477. (on the definist fallacy)
- Keil, Geert (2005): cited after Bexten 2017, p. 240. (on the question of a value-free nature)
- Waldstein, Wolfgang (1992): cited after Bexten 2017, pp. 115—116. (on the positivistically narrowed concept of nature)
- Hildebrand, Dietrich von: Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis (1922). Halle: Niemeyer. (on the objectivity of moral values against naturalism)
- Spaemann, Robert: Personen. Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen “etwas” und “jemand” (1996). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. (on the untenability of the is-ought separation)
- Seifert, Josef (1987): Back to ‘Things in Themselves’. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism. London/New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (on the realist phenomenology of objective values)
See also: Oblivion of the Person, Moral Ought, Ontological Dignity, Intrinsic Value, Value-Response, Personalist Norm, Personhood, Being, Nature, Obligation, Archphenomenon, Natural Law, Empirical-Functionalist Concept of Person, Substance-Ontological Concept of Person, Metaphysics, Concept of Being, David Hume, George Edward Moore, Robert Spaemann, Josef Seifert, Dietrich von Hildebrand