Consciousness is the irreducible basic fact of experience and of intentionality — the directedness of the mind toward objects. It cannot be reduced to neuronal processes, functional states, or information processing.
In Realistic Phenomenology (Husserl, Brentano, Seifert) consciousness is the immediately given datum of experience that precedes every reduction. Brentano determined intentionality as the essential mark of the mental: every consciousness is consciousness of something. Husserl developed this insight into phenomenology.
For the Personhood ontology, consciousness is a archphenomenon — a basic given that cannot be further derived. It belongs to the deutera energeia (second actuality) of the person: the actual exercise of the spiritual faculty. The prote energeia (first actuality) — personhood itself — lies deeper and remains in being even when actual consciousness lapses (in sleep, in dementia, in irreversible loss of brain function).
The AI consciousness debate turns on the question of whether AI systems can have consciousness. The Chinese Room argument and the philosophical zombie show that behavior does not imply consciousness. Statistical ethics simulation is simulation without experience.
Ontological Classification
Superordinate concepts: archphenomenon
Ontological relations:
- altLabel: “conscientia”
- belongs to: deutera energeia (second actuality) of the person
- presupposes: prote energeia (first actuality) (personhood)
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: What Is Human Personhood?
See also
- Intentionality
- Self-Consciousness
- Interiority
- Archphenomenon
- AI Consciousness Debate
- Philosophical Zombie
- Chinese Room Argument
- Cognition
- Soul
- Edmund Husserl
- Franz Brentano
- Josef Seifert
- Max Scheler
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Brentano, Franz (1874): Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. (German)
- Husserl, Edmund (1900/1901): Logical Investigations, transl. J. N. Findlay. London/New York: Routledge, 2001.
- Seifert, Josef (1987): Back to Things in Themselves. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism. London/New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.