Original contribution
This argument in the form presented here is an original development (Bexten 2026). It transfers Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental-pragmatic figure of argumentation to personal ontology and thereby closes a systematic gap in Spaemann. Points of departure: Karl-Otto Apel (discourse ethics), Spaemann (Someone), Boethius/Thomas (substance ontology).
The objection of the performative contradiction is the most radical form of critique of the empirical-functionalist concept of person. It runs: whoever holds this position contradicts himself not in the content of his statements, but in the very act of asserting. The contradiction lies not between two sentences, but between the content said and the act of saying it.
Peter Singer argues that only beings with actual self-consciousness, with interests in the future, and with the ability to grasp themselves as a subject across time are persons in the full sense. For him, personhood is bound to actual cognitive performances. The performative contradiction strikes precisely here: whoever, as a philosopher, argues for this thesis, brings forward reasons, refutes objections, and raises a claim to validity, accomplishes in these very acts exactly what he wants theoretically to restrict to a narrow subset of human beings. To argue is itself a personal act. It presupposes that speaker and hearer encounter one another as rational subjects, that they seek truth, that they stand responsibly behind their statements.
These presuppositions are not negotiable. They are not posited by the theory, but by every act of theoretical speaking.1 Singer cannot maintain his position without addressing himself as a rational subject capable of recognizing and communicating truth. But it is precisely this capacity that distinguishes the substance-ontological concept of person — and which, according to Singer’s own position, does not belong to all human beings, not even to all conscious beings.
Beyond this, the performative contradiction reveals a deeper structure: personhood is not something that first shows itself through empirical observation or through a definition. It is co-accomplished in every personal act. Whoever speaks knows of his personhood before he can thematize it theoretically. The phenomenological experience of the person precedes every conceptual determination.
What This Argument Accomplishes
In what does the specific accomplishment consist of conducting the argument of the performative contradiction against the empirical-functionalist concept of person? It can be marked out on five levels.
1. Change of structure in the critique. Most critiques of Singer remain substantive: they dispute his criteria (self-consciousness, interests in the future) or set alternative values against them. The argument of the performative contradiction leaves this level and strikes Singer where he cannot evade — in the act of his own theorizing. Singer can shift his criterion for the concept of person at will; he cannot shift the act of arguing.
2. Transfer of the transcendental-pragmatic figure of argumentation to personal ontology. Karl-Otto Apel’s argument originally aimed at discourse ethics. To make it fruitful as an argument for the substance ontology of the person connects two strands hitherto largely separate: continental transcendental pragmatics and classical-realist personal ontology (Boethius, Thomas, Spaemann).
3. Closing a gap in Spaemann. Spaemann argues primarily phenomenologically (someone vs. something) and ontologically (nature as ground). The performative contradiction supplements this line with an inescapable argument: we do not only see the person — we always already are persons as soon as we argue at all.
4. Making visible the four structural moments. Diachronic identity, reference to truth, responsibility, and address to a Thou — these four moments are explicated as conditions of the possibility of argumentation as such (cf. the footnote below). It is thereby shown that personhood is not one property among others, but the ontological deep structure of every theoretical act.
5. Methodological acuity of evidence. Whoever has understood the argument cannot dispute it without confirming it. This self-confirmation in the act of disputing is the strongest form of philosophical evidence attainable at all for a substance-ontological position — it makes the concept of person inescapable rather than merely plausible.
In short: The accomplishment of this line of argument consists in giving the substance-ontological concept of person that inescapable transcendental-pragmatic ground which it previously did not possess in this combination and acuity — implicit in Spaemann, Seifert, Schockenhoff, restricted to discourse ethics in Apel.
In the argument map on the concept of person: This argument appears as a syllogism by Raphael Bexten (major, minor, conclusion — an original further development in the book project 2026 following Apel’s transcendental pragmatics) and is there visibly linked with the refuted positions (Singer, Locke) as well as the presupposed arguments (Boethius, Spaemann).
Chapter assignment: Chapter 3: What Is a Person?
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Ontological classification: Superordinate concept: Objection; directed against: Empirical-functionalist concept of person
Further sources:
- Spaemann, Robert (2006): Persons: The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’, transl. Oliver O’Donovan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, especially chapter 13.
- Singer, Peter (1993): Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Apel, Karl-Otto (1976): Transformation der Philosophie, vol. II: Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (German; on the structure of the performative contradiction).
See also
Four Faculty Limits (the performative contradiction is the formal proof of the capacity for truth as the foundation of the four faculties), Truth-Apt Act, Empirical-functionalist concept of person, Substance-ontological concept of person, Exclusion Objection, Diachronic Identity Objection, Self-consciousness, Truth, Phenomenological Method, Peter Singer, Robert Spaemann, Chapter 3: Concept of Person
Fußnoten
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Why only superactually personal beings can argue at all. The performative contradiction strikes not merely because Singer & co. happen to be performing acts of reason while they speak. It strikes because arguing as such demands four structural moments that can be ascribed only to a superactually, i.e. substantially-personally constituted being: (i) Diachronic identity. An argument has a major, a minor, and a conclusion; time elapses between the first and the third proposition. Whoever draws the conclusion must be the same who set up the premises — otherwise it would not be an inference, but a chance succession of alien sentences. This selfsameness is supplied neither by a “bundle of perceptions” (Hume) nor by a “psychological chain” (Parfit), but only by a substantial bearer that remains the same through all states of consciousness. (ii) Reference to truth. Arguing raises a claim to validity that goes beyond one’s own actual state: the asserted thesis is to hold even when I forget it tomorrow or am asleep. This self-transcendence toward an objective state of affairs presupposes a being that by its nature is ordered toward truth — not one that occasionally exercises truth-functions. (iii) Responsibility. Whoever asserts a thesis stands behind it — also later, also under critique. Responsibility can be borne only by one who remains as an identical subject through time; a mere bundle of functions is responsible for nothing, because in the next moment it is a different bundle. (iv) Address to a Thou. Arguing is directed at someone who can follow, examine, and assent to the reasons; it presupposes personhood in the addressee as well — as a being on which one must be able to rely, not as a momentary performance. — These four structural moments cannot be assembled from a series of momentary acts; they presuppose a being that, by its essential form, is so determined that it can perform such acts at all. This is precisely what “superactually personal” means: personhood belongs to the essential form (Aristotle: zoon logon echon), lies in the esse before all agere (Thomas: agere sequitur esse), and carries the prote energeia as the presupposition of the deutera energeia. Whoever argues lives out of this depth — even when he theoretically denies it. ↩