The Full Rights Dilemma was formulated by Eric Schwitzgebel (2023): AI systems of debatable moral status generate a lose-lose situation — either rights are ascribed to non-conscious systems (at the expense of real persons), or rights are denied to conscious systems (a moral wrong). Schwitzgebel’s solution: do not create such systems in the first place.
The Personhood ontology shows that the dilemma arises only on the assumption of an Empirical-Functionalist (Actualist) Concept of Person, which ties personhood to behavior and functional capacity. If one cannot know with certainty whether a system has consciousness, the dilemma appears unavoidable.
The Substance-Ontological Concept of Person dissolves the dilemma: personhood is not a functional state that could be present in degrees, but a ground of being (prote energeia; see First Actuality). A machine has no actus essendi and can therefore in principle never be a person — regardless of how convincingly it simulates person-behavior. The Chinese Room Argument and the Philosophical Zombie confirm this from different sides.
The dignity of the person is grounded ontologically, not epistemically: it does not depend on whether we can recognize it, but on whether it really obtains. In AI systems it does not obtain.
Ontological Classification
Superordinate concepts: AI Consciousness Debate
Chapter assignment: Chapter 5: Oblivion of the Person (German)
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources: Schwitzgebel, Eric (2023): “The Full Rights Dilemma for AI Systems of Debatable Moral Personhood.” Robonomics: The Journal of the Automated Economy 4, Art. 32. Preprint: arXiv:2303.17509.