The inner orientation of the will toward an end. The intention essentially determines the moral character of an action. A good intention alone, however, is not sufficient — the object and circumstances of the action must also be morally defensible. The intention is thus one of the three constitutive elements of the moral evaluation of an action, alongside the object (finis operis) and the circumstances (circumstantiae).
As a personal act, the intention presupposes free will. Only a being capable of self-determination can form an intention. The intention is not merely a psychological state, but a spiritual act of ordering toward a recognized good. In it the freedom of the person shows itself, deciding for an end and directing its action toward it.
Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between the finis operantis (the end of the agent, i.e. the intention) and the finis operis (the end of the action itself). Both must be in agreement for an action to count as morally good (cf. S.Th. I-II, q. 12).
The intention stands in close connection with the decision. The decision concerns the act of will in choosing between alternatives. The intention directs the will toward the superordinate end that motivates the decision.
A morally evil act is not justified by a good intention — the end does not sanctify the means. Conversely, an evil intention can also corrupt an action that is good in itself. This threefold structure of moral evaluation secures the objectivity of morality against subjectivist reductions. It is an essential component of the personalist norm (cf. Bexten 2017, pp. 218 ff.).
Ontological classification:
- Superordinate concept: personal act
- Ontological relation: has-intention (as range — the intention is that toward which an action is directed)
Ontological relations:
- presupposes: free will, cognition
- determines the moral character of: action
- connected with: decision, freedom
Chapter assignment: Chapter 4: Personhood (German)
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 12 (on intention as an act of will toward an end). Transl. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Bros., 1947.
See also: action, free will, decision, freedom, morally good act, morally evil act, personalist norm, personal act, responsibility, Thomas Aquinas