Max Planck was a German physicist, founder of quantum theory, and Nobel laureate (1918). His contribution to the book lies not in physics but in his philosophical reflection on the limits of natural science: Planck argues from within natural science against positivism and scientism — and for the compatibility of natural science and metaphysics.
Key Contribution
In his lecture Religion und Naturwissenschaft (Religion and Natural Science, 1937), Planck develops three theses that are significant for the personalist ontology:
1. Natural Science Presupposes Metaphysics
Natural science depends on presuppositions that it cannot itself supply: the existence of a real external world, the validity of causality, the reproducibility of measurements. These presuppositions are not empirical findings but metaphysical assumptions. Philosophy — as first philosophy — ontologically precedes natural science.
2. Positivism Contradicts Itself
Planck shows that positivism, as a purely critical method, is sterile and, when carried through consistently, ends in an “irrational solipsism.” The universal constants of physics prove a reality independent of the observer — precisely what positivism denies.
3. The Final Cause Cannot Be Eliminated
The principle of least action — a fundamental law of physics — gives, according to Planck, “the impression that nature is governed by a rational, purpose-conscious will.” The causa finalis shows itself even in physics. If even physical nature exhibits teleological structures, then the teleology of personal life — the striving for meaning, the search for truth, self-transcendence — is all the more irreducible to mere causality.
Significance for the Book
Planck’s testimony carries weight for the personalist ontology in two respects. First, a Nobel laureate in physics supplies the argument that natural science itself knows its own limits — against the scientistic appropriation that denies personhood in the name of science. Second, Planck confirms the architecture of the ontology: first philosophy precedes natural science, not the other way around.
Place in the Book
Planck’s critique of positivism provides evidence from natural science for the thesis of Chapter 2 (German) that the question of personhood is a philosophical, not a natural-scientific question — without natural science thereby becoming irrelevant.
Sources: Bexten 2017, pp. 218–254 (theoretical forgetfulness of the person and scientism).
Further sources:
- Planck, Max (1937): “Religion und Naturwissenschaft” (Religion and Natural Science). Lecture delivered in the Baltic states in May 1937. Reprinted in: Planck, Max: Vorträge und Erinnerungen. Stuttgart: Hirzel, 1949, pp. 318–333. Engl.: “Religion and Natural Science.” In: Planck, Max: Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers. Transl. Frank Gaynor. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949.
- Planck, Max (1931): “Positivismus und reale Außenwelt” (Positivism and the Real External World). Lecture delivered on 12 November 1930 at the Harnack House. Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, 1931. Reprinted in: Vorträge und Erinnerungen. Stuttgart: Hirzel, 1949.