Falsificationism is the position in the philosophy of science developed by Karl Popper: a theory is scientific precisely when it can in principle be refuted (falsified) by observation. The criterion of falsifiability is meant to demarcate science from non-science (the demarcation problem).
Popper’s Argument
Popper responds to the problem of induction: from finitely many observations, a universal statement never follows logically. “All swans are white” cannot be proven by millions of white swans, but can be refuted by a single black swan. Scientific progress accordingly consists not in the accumulation of confirming observations, but in the systematic elimination of false theories.
Limits: The Duhem-Quine Thesis
The Duhem-Quine thesis shows the decisive limit of falsificationism: no experiment can falsify a single hypothesis in isolation, because auxiliary hypotheses are always tested along with it. A contradiction between theory and observation shows only that at least one assumption in the system is false — the decision as to which one is to be revised requires a judgment that goes beyond the purely empirical.
This does not make falsifiability worthless — it remains an important regulative ideal — but it is not a sufficient criterion for scientificity. If pure empiricism does not suffice even within natural science, then scientism — the thesis that only what is empirically testable is real — is all the less convincing.
Relation to Philosophy
For the personhood ontology, falsificationism is relevant in two respects:
- As an element of the modern concept of science: The narrowing of the concept of science to the falsifiable methodically excludes philosophy — essential truths are not falsifiable because they hold necessarily.
- As a self-limiting criterion: Popper’s demarcation criterion is itself not falsifiable — it is a philosophical thesis about the nature of science.
Ontological Classification
Superordinate concepts: Modern concept of science
Ontological relations:
- is subclass of: modern concept of science
- is limited by: Duhem-Quine thesis
Chapter assignment: Chapter 2: Method (German)
See also
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology.
Further sources:
- Popper, Karl R. (1934): Logik der Forschung. Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft. Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, vol. 9. Vienna: Julius Springer. — Expanded English edition: The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson, 1959.
- Duhem, Pierre (1906): La Théorie physique: son objet, sa structure. Paris: Chevalier et Rivière. — English: The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, transl. Philip P. Wiener. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954.
- Harding, Sandra G. (ed.) (1976): Can Theories Be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis. Synthese Library 81. Dordrecht: Reidel.