Note: The ethical judgments on this page refer exclusively to the action — never to the person who performs it or makes use of it. Every person possesses inalienable dignity, regardless of what they do or have done. Cf. Note on ethical judgments (German).
Assisted suicide is the action of a third party who provides a person with the means for self-killing or assists her in it. It is an intrinsically evil act and a form of practical oblivion of the person, because it enables the self-killing of a person and thereby participates in the violation of the right to life.
Assisted suicide is ontologically distinct both from suicide and from euthanasia. All three actions are forms of practical oblivion of the person, but they differ in the structure of the action. In suicide, the person acts alone. In euthanasia, a third party carries out the killing. In assisted suicide, a third party provides the means, while the person herself performs the final act.
Despite this structural difference, all three actions share the same fundamental deficiency. They fail to recognize that the personhood and the dignity of the person are not tied to conditions. The life of the person may not be disposed of.
From the standpoint of personal ontology, assisted suicide contains a particular form of oblivion of the person. The assistant claims to serve the will of the person. In doing so, he fails to recognize that the personalistic norm holds even where the person herself can no longer or will no longer fulfil it. The person is to be affirmed for her own sake. This affirmation includes the affirmation of her life, even against the declared will of the person. The freedom of the human being is not the freedom for self-destruction, but the capacity to decide for the good in the light of the truth.
Assisted suicide also concerns the common good and society’s attitude toward the person. Where assisted suicide is institutionalized, a social climate arises in which the life of persons is regarded as “disposable”. This holds especially for sick, old, or suffering persons. It contradicts the principle that every person is someone and not merely something.
The subjective distress of the person who wishes to make use of assisted suicide is not thereby denied. The ontology judges the objective character of the action, not the subjective guilt of those involved. The answer to the suffering of a person is not the ending of her life, but the turning toward her as a person — in love, care, and accompaniment.
Ontological Classification
Superordinate concepts: Intrinsically evil act, Practical oblivion of the person
Ontological relations:
- violates: Personalistic norm, Right to life
- disjoint with: Euthanasia, Suicide
- participates in: the violation of the right to life
Chapter assignment: Chapter 5: Oblivion of the Person (German)
Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology. Bexten 2017, pp. 293–306 (oblivion of the person as a phenomenon of deficiency and its practical consequences).
Further sources:
- Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 64, a. 5 (on the impermissibility of self-killing). Transl. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Bros., 1947.